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INTRODUCTION

Sexual offenders constitute a grave social problem in contemporary
American society.' For a quarter century, sexual abuse claims have been
brought against an increasing number of Roman Catholic dioceses and
priests,2 and against members of other religious denominations as well.'

1 See, e.g., MySpace Pulls 90,000 Sex Offenders From Site, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2009, at A3 (noting that this figure was nearly double what
MySpace officials had originally reported the previous year).
See, e.g., Scott Glover & Jack Leonard, Cardinal Mahony Under Federal
Fraud Probe Over Abusive Priests, Sources Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009
(reporting that Cardinal Mahony "was accused of transferring priests who molested
children to other parishes rather than removing them from the priesthood and
alerting authorities."); see also David L. Gregory, Some Reflections on Labor and
Employment Ramifications of Diocesan Bankruptcy Filings, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL
STUD. 97 (2008) (discussing the significance of Roman Catholic dioceses filing for
bankruptcy in the wake of clergy sexual abuse scandals, and making significant
mention of liability insurers proactively filing declaratory judgment actions to
avoid coverage in clergy sexual abuse claims). Clergy sexual abuse claims have
not been limited to the United States, and high profile clergy sexual abuse claims
also have been reported in a number of other countries as well, including Australia,
Brazil, Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium. See, e.g., Henry
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Sexual predators who abuse minor children should be prosecuted to
the fullest extent of the law, and face serious criminal and civil liability for
their detestable acts. But should these sexual abuse claims, including
clergy sexual abuse, be covered under liability insurance policies, which
commonly exclude acts that are "expected or intended from the viewpoint
of the insured"? The courts have been far from uniform in addressing this
and other related issues arising under liability insurance policies.4
Beginning with the earliest claims for insurance for sexual abuse,
liability insurers typically have denied coverage for such claims under
standard liability insurance policies. Insurers long have contended that the

Chu, CardinalAsked Victim to Keep Silent, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010 ("The
former head of Belgium's Roman Catholic Church acknowledged Monday that he
was wrong to have urged a sexual abuse victim to stay quiet until after the bishop
who repeatedly molested him over a span of 13 years could retire.").
3 See, e.g., Carolyn Peirce, Jewish Coalition Want Abuse Victims to Speak Out,
WASH. EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com
/local/jewish-coalition-want-abuse-victims-speak-out (reporting on an Orthodox
Jewish cantor who had previously participated in an international child
pornography ring. "It's like the Catholic Church all over, but not as large," one
coalition member stated.); see also Charles Toutant, Mormon Church Sued on
Charges of Sexual Abuse by Youth Leader, 185 N.J. L.J. 475 (2006) (reporting that
a Mormon bishop from Provo, Utah notified the child abuser's new ward, or
congregation, about his previous criminal sexual offenses in Utah and Wisconsin,
but the ward still put him in positions working with children in Dallas, Texas, and
later working with children in Ledgewood, New Jersey).
4 See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDONADO & JOSHUA D. ROGERS,
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§ 127:24-127:28 (2008 rev. ed.) [hereinafter COUCH
ON INSURANCE]; JERRET E. SALE & LINDA M. BOLDUAN, Insurance Coveragefor
Sexual Molestation, in 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law Of Liability Insurance Ch.
11 C (Matthew Bender ed. 2010) [hereinafter LONG ON LIABILITY INSURANCE]; see
also Jesse J. Cooke, Book Note, Beyond an Unfortunate "Occurrence":Insurance
Coverage and the Equitable Redress of Victims of Sexual PredatorPriests, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1039 (2004); Barron L. Weinstein, Sexual Misconduct Claims: A
Policyholder's Perspective of Key Coverage Issues, 38 THE BRIEF 49 (2009);
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions
ofLiability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by
Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984); Joseph Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church
or Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5th 530 (1992),
superseded in part by Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of Church or
Religious Organizationfor Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision of Priest,
Minister,or Other Clergy Based on Sexual Misconduct, 101 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2002).
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standard general liability policy was not intended to cover intentional acts,
including sexual abuse.'
At the same time, the insurance industry has made available a
special "sexual abuse" coverage endorsement to add coverage specifically
for sexual abuse. When the sexual abuse endorsement is purchased,
liability coverage for sexual abuse is expressly afforded. However, most
insureds have not purchased this add-on coverage.
Because insurance generally exists only to provide indemnity for
fortuitous, unexpected, and accidental loss, and because insurance
generally does not provide coverage for intentional acts, liability insurers
usually except from coverage intentional acts, or "expected or intended"
injury.' Indeed, the underlying public policy rationale against insurance
indemnification for intended loss is so strong that the courts will in some
circumstances forbid payment of insurance benefits, even if the insurance
policy is silent on this particular point. However, the states differ markedly
on the type of intentional conduct that is sufficiently volitional in nature to
bar coverage.
Over the last decade, a number of policyholders facing sexual
abuse claims, including clergy sexual abuse, have taken the position that
even if a sexual offender's acts arguably were "expected or intended," and
therefore excluded from coverage under a liability insurance policy's
"expected or intended" provision, the sexual offender's employer,
supervisor, or religious order might still come within policy coverage under
the legal doctrine of negligent supervision, negligent hiring, negligent

5 See,

e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 158-59 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 490
(Iowa 1988); Rodriguez ex rel Brennan v. Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986) ("The average person purchasing homeowner's insurance would
cringe at the very suggestion" that the person was paying for coverage for sexual
abuse, "[a]nd certainly [the person] would not want to share that type of risk with
other homeowner's policy holders.").
6 See, e.g., Jane D. v. Ordinary Mut., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995); Dobbs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 773 N.E.2d 1251 (111. App. Ct. 2002).
7 See generally ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 63C (4th ed. 2007); JEFFREY R. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 1.06[B], 1.08[2] (3d ed., rev. vol. 2010).
8 See generally EMERIC FISCHER, PETER N. SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 58-68 (3d rev. ed. 2006).
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retention, or under similar doctrines based upon negligence principles
rather than based on intentionalacts by the insured.9
This article addresses issues that arise when a policyholder under a
standard general liability insurance policy, not containing an express sexual
abuse coverage endorsement (or an express sexual abuse exclusion), seeks
insurance coverage for sexual abuse claims. Such cases continue to
increase in frequency as the legacy of sexual abuse and molestation
generates an unrelenting deluge of insurance coverage claims.
The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze the case law
and various legal theories supporting and rejecting liability insurance
coverage claims involving institutional sexual abuse allegations. This
article concludes by recommending a better-reasoned objective concurrent
causation legal doctrine that would bring a realistic, and more uniform,
judicial approach to the liability insurance interpretive conundrum
involving clergy sexual abuse coverage disputes. The article also
synthesizes the law concerning other prominent coverage issues in the
rapidly developing area of sexual abuse insurance claims.
A. CIVIL ACTIONS To RECOVER FOR SEXUAL ABUSE.

Until the 1980s, civil actions for sexual abuse were uncommon,
although examples dating back more than fifty years can be found.'o
Certainly, in the United States there were far fewer reports of clergy sexual
abuse in earlier years, and almost certainly fewer instances of sexual abuse

9

See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 169 F.3d
947 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law) (holding that the negligent training and
supervision of a minister was covered, even though the minister's sexual assault
was not covered); Mfrs. & Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 498 S.E.2d 222 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a claim of negligent entrustment was covered,
although sexual molestation of minors by the insured was not covered). But see
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1996)
(applying Minnesota law) (holding that negligent and reckless supervision claims
involving a priest child molester were not covered since the Archdiocese knew or
should have known that personal injury from child sexual abuse was highly likely
to occur); Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002) (holding
that a separate negligent supervision claim was not covered since it causally
resulted in the sexual molestation of a child).
1o See, e.g., McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360 (Wash.
1953) (student who allegedly was raped at school claimed school was negligent in
leaving students unsupervised and allowing access to darkened area).
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in general." However, by the late 1970s, reports of sexual abuse of
children had sharply increased,12 and claims seeking financial
compensation for sexual molestation increased rapidly.
In recent decades, assorted youth organizations have been sued for
sexual molestation, although in many cases the courts have held such
sexual abuse was not foreseeable.13 In some of these cases, plaintiffs have
alleged prior knowledge on the part of a responsible parent or supervisor.
However, allegations concerning pervasive knowledge and deliberate
tolerance of sexual abuse - and even conspiracies to allow it or to conceal
it - are rarely pled in suits against lay organizations, although they have
became a staple of clergy sexual abuse lawsuits during the last two
decades, as discussed below.
Adults sued for sexual abuse occurring within their own home also
have been held subject to liability under principles set forth in Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 316 (Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child). 14
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 provides that parents are obligated to
prevent their children from creating a risk of bodily harm to others if the
parent "(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control."' 5
Similarly, one may be subject to liability for sexual offenses
committed by one's spouse. "[W]hen a spouse has actual knowledge or
special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in
sexually abusive behavior against a particular person or persons, a spouse
has a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm . .
" See THE NAT'L REVIEW BD. FOR THE PROT. OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG
PEOPLE, A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES 22-25 (2004).

12 Id. at 23.
13 See, e.g., Doe v. Goff, 716 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the
Boy Scouts of America could not be held liable for failure to prevent the sexual
assault of a Boy Scout because it was unforeseeable); H.B. ex rel. Clark v.
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a trailer park manager
did not have a duty to warn or protect children whom she knew were being
sexually abused by a resident); Montgomery v. YMCA of Cincinnati, 531 N.E.2d
731 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
14 See, e.g., Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. 2000).
1s Id. Likewise, there is a duty to control the conduct of a third person as to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another if a "special relationship"
exists between the actor and the other person that gives to the other a right of
protection. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a)-(b) (2010).
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. [and] breach of such a duty constitutes a proximate cause of the resultant
injury, the sexual abuse of the victim.",16 For example, a wife who invited
children to visit her house, when she knew her husband had molested
women and children in the past, was subject to liability in negligence."
Even a grandmother was held subject to liability for failing to protect her
granddaughter from a known risk of sexual abuse by the grandfather.' 8
Such actions, however, rarely compare to clergy sexual abuse
litigation in terms of the alleged degree of institutional knowledge and
culture of tolerance of sexual abuse. It is largely these features that
generate profound questions whether general liability policies afford
coverage in regard to clergy sexual abuse actions.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND ORDERS

Public knowledge of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic clergy
became widespread in 1984 with the well-publicized revelations
concerning Father Gilbert Gauthe in Lafayette, Louisiana. Prior to 1984,
the Catholic Church, like many organizations that minister to minors, long
had been troubled by pedophilia and similar abuse by its employees and
agents.19 In 1957, a Church expert in treating offenders reportedly had
advised one or more archbishops that: "Experience has taught us these men
are too dangerous to the children of the parish and the neighborhood" to
J.S. ex rel. C.S. v. B.J.H., 714 A.2d 924, 935 (N.J. 2000).
17 Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See also Big
Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Terrell, 359 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (social service organization); Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 843 P.2d 154 (Idaho
1982) (wife's "acts or failure to act ... may have created or contributed to the
environment which permitted her ex-husband's [molestation]," but did not
constitute an occurrence under insurance policy because it was not the conduct that
caused the injury); Metro. Prop. & Cas Ins. Co. v. Miller, 589 N.W.2d 297, 300
(Minn. 1999) (suing wife for her "alleged failure to warn of or prevent the abuse"
where husband molested minor child).
18 Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. 1996). But see, e.g., T.A. ex
rel. Kramer v. Allen, 669 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that stepgrandparent did not owe any special duty to step-grandchildren to control her
husband's conduct, and was thus not liable for her husband's abuse under
negligence theory).
19 See generally Rev. Thomas Doyle, A Very Short History of Clergy Sexual
Abuse in the Catholic Church, CRUSADE AGAINST CLERGY ABUSE,
http:\\www.crusadeagainstclergysbuse.com/htm/AShortHistory.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
16
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continue in their current ministries. 20 By 1971, there allegedly were
discussions at the bishopric level concerning clergy sexual abuse.2'
The perceived institutional character of the sexual abuse problem
(particularly pedophilia) in religious organizations helps explain why civil
complaints frequently allege facts indicating such organizations possessed
a high degree of knowledge that minor laity were in jeopardy of abuse by
priests. For example, complaints not uncommonly allege the failure of the
religious organization to report prior known instances of child abuse.22
Allegations of prior knowledge are alleged with distinct conviction. A
representative complaint alleges:
Although [defendant order of friars] knew Father Posey
was unsuitable for his position, they failed to review and
monitor his performance, to confront him, and to sanction
him about "known irregularities in his employment," e.g.,
taking young children on trips and to his home.23
Civil conspiracy claims also frequently accompany claims of
clergy sexual assault or abuse.24 A typical complaint alleges that school
administrators:
agreed or otherwise conspired to cover up incidents of
sexual abuse of minors by Salesian priests and/or
educators and to prevent disclosure, prosecution and civil
litigation including, but not limited to: failure to report
incidents of abuse to law enforcement or child protection
agencies; denial of abuse [they] had substantiated; aiding
criminal child molesters in evading detection, arrest and
prosecution; allowing criminal child molesters to cross
state and international borders for purposes of gaining
access to uninformed parents whose innocent children
could be sexually abused; failure to warn; and failure to

20

21

d
id

See, e.g., Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07-2091, 2008 WL
1743436, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2008).
23 John Doe CS v. Capuchin Franciscan Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130
(E.D.24 Mo. 2007).
See Nunnery, 2008 WL 1743436.
22
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seek out and redress the injuries its priests and / or
educators had caused.25
In litigation against Capuchin Franciscan Friars, it was
alleged:
Defendants knowingly failed to disclose Father Posey's
sexual misconduct.

... Defendant[s] and the Roman

Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis and the Archbishop of
the Archdiocese of St. Louis, in concert with one another,
and with the intent to conceal and defraud, conspired and
came to a meeting of the minds whereby they would
misrepresent, conceal, or fail to disclose information
relating to the sexual misconduct of Defendant[s]' agents.
By so concealing, Defendant[s] committed at least one act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.26
Such allegations, it has been held, are premised on factual assertions and
thus "cannot be characterized as . . . 'bald assertions'

and 'legal

conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations ..."allegations."' 27
In sum, complaints against clergy and religious institutions are
often distinguished by (1) allegations of specific facts constituting prior
knowledge, and (2) allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and other similar
schemes. These alleged fact patterns form the predicate for an expanding
body of law concerning insurance coverage for clergy sexual abuse. *
Liability insurance policyholders who would be barred from
coverage for acts of sexual misconduct that are expected or intended from
Id at *7.
Capuchin Friars,520 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
27 Nunnery, 2008 WL 1743436
at *7.
28 Moreover, since a number of sexual abuse "occurrences" have
taken place
over a period of many decades, and since some states have suspended otherwise
applicable statutes of limitation, and now allow plaintiffs in sexual abuse cases to
bring previously barred claims, the possibility of multiple liability insurers and
"lost policies" over many years may constitute another real problem. See, e.g., City
of Sharonville v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio 2006) (holding that
when a liability insurance policy has been lost or destroyed, the existence of
coverage may be proved by secondary evidence other than the policy itself,
including circumstantial evidence of payment records, renewal letters,
miscellaneous correspondence, or prior claim files, unless the record contains
evidence that the policy was lost or destroyed in bad faith).
25

26
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the viewpoint of the sexual molester,29 are increasingly bringing coverage
claims they assert are predicated upon negligence-based claims against the
sexual molester's employer, supervisor, religious organization, or another
co-insured. These underlying claims typically are based upon claims of
negligent supervision, negligent employment, negligent retention, and other
negligence principles involving vicarious liability. The courts have been
far from uniform in how they treat such claims.30
Although many courts have not recognized vicarious sexual abuse
liability claims based upon agency principles3 1 or based upon the doctrine
of respondeatsuperior,32 nevertheless the courts are deeply divided on the
See generally infra Part II (discussing and analyzing the Intentional Acts
Exclusion).
3o See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, § 127:27; LONG ON
LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 4, ch. 11C.02[8]; Cooke, supra note 4;
Weinstein, supra note 4; Conder, supra note 4; Shields, supra note 4.
29

3 See, e.g., Capuchin Friars,520 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (holding that sexual
misconduct by a Roman Catholic priest toward his student did not fall within the

scope of the priest's employment under Missouri law, and therefore a religious
order could not be held liable for the priest's actions under an agency theory); Gray
v. Ward, 950 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (similar holding); Eckler v. Gen.
Council of Assemblies of God, 784 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App. 1990) (summary

judgment granted to defendant church based on an agency theory alleged by the
plaintiff).
32 See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. La.
1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Roman Catholic church
was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged illicit
sexual acts of a Roman Catholic priest, where such acts were not in furtherance of
the priest's duties and did not advance church doctrine, and where there was no
evidence that the church authorized the priest's illicit sexual acts in advance, or
ratified them afterwards); Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the doctrine of respondeat
superior was not available to impose liability on a religious institution based upon
allegations of childhood sexual abuse by a priest, since this sexual abuse was

outside the scope of the cleric's employment); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic
Diocese, 909 A.2d 983 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that a bishop, monsignor,
and the church were not vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for sexual assaults committed by a priest on a minor since it was contrary
to the teachings of the church, and the priest's sexual assaults on the minor were
repugnant to his employer's business and in contravention to the employer's aims
and rules); Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So.2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that the local church, the church conference, and church district
superintendents were not liable to a member of the congregation for alleged sexual
misconduct by a pastor under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior, since the sexual
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issue of whether a church or other religious organization should be held
liable for the negligent hiring, the negligent retention, or the negligent
supervision of a priest, minister, or other clergy member based upon
allegations of sexual misconduct.
A number of courts have recognized such claims based upon
vicarious liability principles of negligent hiring, negligent retention, or
negligent supervision of a priest or other clergy member.33 Other courts,
misconduct of the pastor was for personal motives, and not to further the interests
of the church); Olinger v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (holding that the church
could not be vicariously liable under Kentucky law for a missionary's alleged
sexual molestation of a minor child, since there was no evidence that the
missionary or anyone else believed that he was acting to further the interest of the
church at the time of the alleged sexual misconduct, and such sexual molestation
was clearly outside the scope of the missionary's employment). But see Doe v.
Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (plaintiffs respondeat superior
claim survived motion to dismiss on basis that church knew or should have known
about past misconduct and mental disease or defect made misconduct a realistic
threat, but noting that this was a "remarkably tenuous" basis for imposing
respondeat superiorliability); Parks v. Kownacki, 711 N.E.2d 1208 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999) (holding that questions of material fact as to whether a parish priest was a
child abuser or not, and whether the church or diocese which appointed the priest
knew, or should have known, of his tendencies precluded the dismissal of a lawsuit
against the church and the diocese based on the doctrine of respondeat superior),
rev'd, 737 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2000).
3 See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 56 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.
Conn. 1999) (applying Conn. law) (holding that the Roman Catholic Marianist
Society had actual or constructive knowledge of the priest's grossly inappropriate
sexual misconduct toward the plaintiffs); Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1077-78
(applying Iowa law) (holding that a parishioner's allegation that the church,
diocese, and bishop knew of a priest's "mental disease or defect" and the threat
posed to parishioners was sufficient to state a claim for negligent supervision
arising out of the priest's sexual assault of the parishioner); Mark K., 79 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 78 (holding that in an action for negligent supervision and retention of a
priest who sexually molested a child, the archdiocese had failed to warn the victim
of the priest's known propensity for engaging in sexual misconduct with boys);
Fortin v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Maine 2005)
(stating there were sufficient facts to hold the diocese liable for negligent
supervision of a priest who sexually abused a parochial school student and altar
boy); Hutchison ex rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (finding
that the Roman Catholic Church, bishop, and diocese negligently hired, supervised,
and retained a priest, despite knowledge of his pedophilic disposition, when the
priest later molested a minor in a motel room).
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however, have not recognized these vicarious liability claims sounding in
Still other courts have split in holding that the First
negligence.34
Amendment of the United States Constitution may-or may not-bar a
legal action against a church or other religious organization for the
negligent retention or supervision of a clergy member who engaged in
sexual misconduct.35
34 See, e.g., Wilson v. Diocese of N.Y. of the Episcopal Church, No. 96 Civ.
2400,1998 WL 82921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998) (applying N.Y. law) (holding that
an Episcopal diocese and individual church were not liable for the negligent
supervision or training of a priest who allegedly sexually assaulted the plaintiff,
where there was no evidence that the diocese knew, or should have known, of any
alleged propensity on the priest's part to commit sexual assault); Beach v. Jean,
746 A.2d 228 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that defendant Roman Catholic
diocese and church could not foresee the specific sexual harm alleged by the
plaintiff, and did not know or suspect that the pastor posed a risk to minors);
Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Sefior, Inc. v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that the church did not have actual or constructive notice of
the pastor's sexual misconduct); Pachulski v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Grand
Rapids, No. 205293, 1999 WL 33441139 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 1999) (holding
that the diocese and the diocese's bishop had no actual knowledge of the priest's
sexual misconduct with a minor); C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church
in Am., 726 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that church entities were
not liable for the minister's sexual abuse of a minor under the theory of negligent
supervision, since there was no evidence that the church was put on notice of the
minister's sexual abuse); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999)
(holding that the critical element for recovery under a negligent hiring, retention,
or supervision theory is the employer's prior knowledge of an employee's
propensity to commit the harm, and the national organization had no notice of any
previous act or incident that would have alerted it to the fact that the minister was a
pedophile, and was sexually abusing children); Eckler, 784 S.W.2d at 941 (holding
that in order for an act of negligence to be a proximate cause of the injury, it must
be a cause in fact of the injury, and the injury must be reasonably foreseeable. The
court noted that the general church council had not been notified of any complaints
against the local church or a youth minister who had allegedly sexually abused
children, and therefore it had no duty to supervise or investigate the local church
and its ministers); Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 700 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 2005)
(holding the archdiocese was not liable under a negligent supervision claim, since
there was no evidence that the archdiocese knew or should have known of the
priest's abusive tendencies at or before the time the minor was sexually abused).
3 See, e.g., Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(purportedly applying New York law); Gray, 950 S.W.2d 232; Mars v. Diocese of
Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563
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When the religious organization is subject to liability, the
organization almost invariably looks to its insurer to defend it and to pay
claims. We now analyze and discuss the developing law concerning
insurance coverage for sexual abuse claims.
II.

THE DEVELOPING LAW OF LIABILITY
COVERAGE FOR SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS

INSURANCE

A. OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES

Modern standard general liability policies condition insurance
coverage on whether there has been an "occurrence." These policies
typically define "occurrence" as:
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
general conditions, resulting in bodily injury or property
damages neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured.
Also, standard general liability policies often include the following
exclusion:
We will not provide insurance:
2. For personal injury or property damage:
a. which is either expected or intended by you;
This is known as the "intentional act exclusion."
In light of the afore-cited and similar provisions, many sexual
abuse coverage disputes have turned upon: (1) whether sexual molestation
falls within the policy's intentional act exclusion, or (2) whether sexual
molestation meets the "occurrence" definition in the policy. The decisions
usually analyze whether bodily injury was "expected" or "intended" by the
insured. In addition, some courts ask a threshold question: whether sexual
abuse itself can be an "accident."
N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997). But see Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121 (111. App. Ct.
1995); Fortin, 871 A.2d 1208; Olson v. First Church of the Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d
254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,

654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 1997); Christopher B. v. Schoeneck, No. 99-0450,
1999 WL 1102901 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1999), review denied, 2000 Wisc.

LEXIS 305 (Feb. 22, 2000).
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The "expected or intended" question must be addressed even when
the policy does not contain an "intentional act" exclusion. This is because
the "occurrence" definition, contained in the vast majority of standard
general liability policies, affords coverage only for bodily injury that is
"neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." It has
been held that this "neither expected nor intended" clause in the
"occurrence" definition is the equivalent of the intentional act exclusion.36
Accordingly, decisions applying the intentional act exclusion, as discussed
infra § IB, frequently provide guidance regarding the "occurrence"
question.
B. THE "EXPECTED" OR "INTENDED" ISSUE UNDER GENERAL
LIABILITY POLICIES

An "occurrence" in homeowners and commercial general liability
insurance generally is limited to unexpected, unintended, and accidental
loss. 37 Also, many liability insurance policies contain an "intentional act
exclusion" providing that coverage is excluded for "bodily injury or
property damage that is expected or intended by the insured."" The
underlying public policy rationale of this "intentional act exclusion" in
liability insurance is that it would defeat the purpose of insurance and
encourage "moral hazard" if a policyholder could be compensated for
losses he intentionally brings about, knowing that the insurer would be
liable for any resulting damages or personal injury.39
But how have the courts decided which acts are "expected or
intended by the insured"? There are currently three major judicial
W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 492 (W. Va. 2004)
(citing Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981)).
3 See generally STEMPEL, supra note 7, at § 1.06[B][1].
36

38

See 1 SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILLIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD

INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 214, 409, 414 (4th ed. 1995) (citing to the

Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) Forms HO 00 03 04 91 (Homeowners
Insurance) and CG 00 01 10 93 (Commercial General Liability Insurance)); see,
e.g., Transamerica Ins. Grp. v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 186 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc)
(holding that there is a strong underlying public policy that forbids insurers from
indemnifying persons against loss resulting from their own willful wrongdoing.
The intentional act exclusion therefore "is designed to prevent an insured from
acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insurance company will
'pay the piper' for the damages").
39 See, e.g., W. Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954, 959-60 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986).
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approaches for interpreting the "expected" or "intended" question under
liability insurance policies involving sexual abuse claims: (1) the
"objective" or "classic tort" standard for determining acts that are intended
or expected from the viewpoint of the insured; (2) the "subjective" or
"particular insured" standard for determining acts that are intended or
expected from the viewpoint of the insured; and (3) the "inferred intent"
standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases.4 0
1. The "Objective" or "Classic Tort" Standard for
Determining Intentional Acts in Liability Insurance
Coverage Disputes
Under an "objective" or "classic tort" standard, a court will look at
the natural and probable consequences of the insured's deliberate act in
order to determine the insured's intent.4' If an intentional act by the
insured results in injuries that are, in an objective sense, the natural,
foreseeable, and probable result of the insured's intentional act, such loss is
excluded from coverage under the liability insurance intentional acts
exclusion.4 2 Commentators have differed, however, on whether this

40

See, e.g., Peter C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS.

L.J. 147, 149 (2000) ("Proximate cause is a factor in all three types of civil actions
seeking damages: common law torts, common law contract, and statutory.
However, tort actions have been the subject of most of the judicial and scholarly
attention devoted to proximate cause.").
41 See, e.g., CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984)
(sexual assault of a minor); see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Pickering, 642 S.W.2d
113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (involving an intentional wrongful death action and
holding that "one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
his acts and conduct."); Mutual Serv. Cas. Co. v. McGehee, 711 P.2d 826, 827-28
(Mont. 1985) (action for battery); Fuisz v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 61 F.3d
238 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying Va. law) (defamation action). But see also Rodriguez
v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (criticizing this
"objective" or "classic tort" standard in an insurance law context). See also infra
note 43 (citing additional authority).
42 See, e.g., COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, at § 127:2d ("A majority of
courts utilize an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intentional.
Accordingly, sexual abuse is considered an intentional act when the injury is the
natural and probable consequence of the insured's conduct.") (citing to a number
of cases arguably supporting this proposition, including B.B. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 8
F.3d 1288, 2195 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Mo. law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v.
Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947, 956 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Troy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 F.
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traditional "objective" or "classic tort" standard applied to cases of rape,
sexual assault, and sexual molestation is the majority view,43 or a minority
-eW44
view."
2. The "Subjective" or "Particular Insured" Standard for
Determining Intentional Acts in Liability Insurance
Coverage Disputes
Under a "subjective" or "particular insured" standard, the court
must find not only that the insured intended a specific act, but also that the
insured intended a specific harm. 45 The "subjective" standard-that the
insured must have intended both the conduct in question, and the insured
must have intended some type of injury,46 or a particular type of injury,47 is
the majority approach today 48 involving most intentional acts committed by
Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Kan. 1992); Fernandez v. Strand, 63 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956
(E.D.42Wis. 1999)).
See, e.g., JERRY &RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 439-69 (commenting that the
"classic tort" or "objective" standard is a minority approach); LONG ON LIABILITY,
supra note 4, at § llC.02[1][c][i] (same).
43 See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H.
1984) (concerning battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
arising out of the alleged sexual abuse of a minor); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope,
No. 09-078, 2010 WL 3934335, at *5 (Vt. 2010).
" See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 439-69 (commenting that the
"classic tort" or "objective" standard is a minority approach); LONG ON LIABILITY,
supranote 4, at § 11 C.02[1][c][i] (same).
45 See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H.
1984) (concerning battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
arising out of the alleged sexual abuse of a minor); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope,
No. 09-078, 2010 WL 3934335, at *5 (Vt. 2010);
46 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 816 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1991)
(assault and battery claims); Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1992)
(alleged battery and wrongful death claim caused by a thrown baseball); Tenn.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1991) (alleged arson of
property).
47 See, e.g., Providence Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 638 A.2d 1246 (N.H. 1994)
(personal injury from a BB gun); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 617
S.E.2d 797 (W.Va. 2005) (suicide deaths of inmates). But see also FISCHER,
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 62 ("The specific intent view errs too greatly
in favor of the policyholder by insulating him or her from the financial
consequences of antisocial conduct.").
48 But see supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
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an insured in liability insurance coverage disputes other than child sexual
49
abuse cases.
A growing number of courts have questioned whether this majority
"subjective" standard approach is appropriate in liability insurance claims
involving child sexual abuse allegations. Although an insured seeking
coverage for injuries arising out of sexual misconduct and sexual abuse
may argue that he or she had no subjective intent to "harm" the minor
child,so most courts have characterized these subjective assertions made by
adult sexual molesters that they did not subjectively intend to harm their
child sexual abuse victims as "absurd" and "irrational" 5' For example, the
California Supreme Court in the case of J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance

Co. v. MK.,52 observed that the insurer contended coverage was excluded:
[T]he [sexual] molestations were intentional. Defendants
respond that even an intentional and wrongful act is not
excluded from coverage unless the insured acted with a
"preconceived design to inflict injury." They contend
psychiatric testimony shows that molesters ... often intend
no harm despite the depravity of their acts, and that the

49 See generally FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 58-65; JERRY
& RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 463-67.
50 See, e.g., Atl. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers
Pre-Sch. Day Care Ctr.,

Inc., 571 A.2d 300, 303 (N.J. Super. 1990) ("While socially unacceptable, [the
insured sexual molester] argue[s] a pedophile or other sexual deviant may not
necessarily [subjectively] intend to cause his or her victims any injury, even though

that behavior may constitute criminal activity."); see also Northland Ins. Cos. v.
Coconut Island Corp., 961 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Maine, 1997); Fire Ins. Exch. v.
Abbott, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (similar subjective arguments
made by sexual abusers).
s' See, e.g., Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989)
(holding that the sexual molester's subjective argument "defied logic"); Mut. of
Enumclaw v. Merrill, 794 P.2d 818, 820 (Ore. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the
sexual molester's subjective argument was "little short of absurd"); see also CNA
Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984) ("We agree with the view
expressed by the dissent in the Court of Appeals in this case, that for a stepfather in
such a situation 'to claim that he did not expect or intend to cause injury, flies in
the face of all reason, common sense and experience."') (quoting CNA Ins. Co. v.
McGinnis, 663 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (Corbin, J., dissenting)).
52 J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K, 804 P.2d 689 (Cal.), cert. denied sub nom,
502 U.S. 902 (1991).
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molestation is often a misguided attempt to display love
and affection for the child.
The court concluded:
We conclude there is no coverage as a matter of law. No
rational person can reasonably believe that sexual
fondling, penetration, and oral copulation of a five-yearold child are nothing more than acts of tender mercy . . .
The courts of many other states also have considered the
issue and, almost without exception, have held there is no
coverage.54
Because the subjective intent test is capable of reaching a
conclusion - that the molester intended no harm - that is anathema to

prevailing logic and public policy sensibilities regarding child abuse and
molestation, it has fallen into extreme disfavor over the last decade.
Accordingly, the "inferred intent" standard has emerged as the majority
view today.
3. The "Inferred Intent" Standard as Applied to Child Sexual
Abuse Cases
A substantial majority of courts have applied an "inferred intent"
standard to bar coverage in sexual molestation cases involving an adult
sexual predator and a sexually abused child, even when the insured sexual
molester asserts the absence of any subjective intent to harm the child."
5 Id. at 693.
$4 Id.
5 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.
1989) (applying Cal. law) (holding that there is an irrebuttable presumption of
intent to harm as a matter of law in child molestation cases); J C. Penney, 804 P.2d
at 695 ("There is no such thing as negligent or even reckless sexual molestation.
The very essence of child molestation is the gratification of sexual desire. The act
is the harm. There cannot be one without the other. Thus, the intent to molest is, by
itself, the same as the intent to harm."), cert. denied sub nom, Kelley v. J.C.
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 502 U.S. 902 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589
N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992) ("[I]n the exceptional case of an act of child
molestation, cause and effect cannot be separated; that to do the act is necessarily
to do the harm which is its consequence; and that since unquestionably the act is
intended, so also is the harm."). See generally Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
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The underlying public policy rationale for this "inferred intent" standard
when applied to child sexual abuse claims is premised on a state's criminal
prohibition of sexual contact between an adult and a child, as well as the
reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage. 57
Although a majority of courts have adopted and applied this
"inferred intent" standard in cases where the insured asserts a subjective
intent not to harm the minor victim, a more subtle issue is raised when the
insured asserts an incapacity to form any requisite intent. Some courts
have reasoned that if the nature and character of the act are such that an
intent to harm may be inferred, such as in cases involving the insured's acts
of child sexual abuse, then any question of an inability to form this intent to
harm, whether it arises out of alleged mental disease or incapacity, or
whether it arises out of voluntary intoxication, is immaterial in resolving
the insurer's obligation to coverage, and the insured's intent to harm in

Co., 995 F.2d 457, 461-62 nn.5-6 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Pa. law) (stating that
this majority "inferred intent" standard applied as a matter of law to child sexual
abuse claims has been adopted in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So.2d 458, 463-64 (Ala. 1993) (also collecting cases from
other jurisdictions); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 418-19 (Colo.
1990), rev'g, 768 P.2d 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero,
589 N.E.2d 365, 368 (N.Y. 1992), rev'g, 561 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(also collecting cases from other jurisdictions).
56 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 907 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir.
1990) (predicting Nev. law); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053
(Fla. 1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992);
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Abernethy, 445 S.E.2d 618, 620 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Rodriguez v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (Wash. 1986).
5 See, e.g., Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 464 (3d Cir.
1993) (applying Pa. law) ("[T]he average person purchasing homeowner's
insurance would cringe at the very suggestion that he was paying for [coverage for
liability arising out of his sexual abuse of a child]. And certainly he would not
want to share that type of risk with other homeowner's policy holders.") (quoting
Rodriguez ex rel. Brennan v. Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash. Ct. App.),
aff'd, 729 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1986)); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589
N.E.2d 365, 370 (N.Y. 1992); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581,
586 (W. Va. 1988) (similar holdings).
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such a context therefore is irrelevant.18 Other courts hold that, as a matter
of law, an insured may never assert a lack of capacity to form intent caused
by voluntary intoxication as a defense to the application of an intentional
act exclusion, regardless of the act committed.59 A minority of other courts
have held, however, that where an incapacity to form intent to harm is
alleged, that incapacity may render unintentional any harm caused by the
insured, so that such an incapacity must be considered by the finder of fact
when resolving the issue of any existence of intent to harm.o
In conclusion, under either the "objective" or "classic tort"
standard,' or under an "inferred intent" standard,62 the overwhelming
majority of American courts have persuasively-- and correctly-- held that
an adult sexual molester of an abused child will not be entitled to coverage
under a liability insurance policy based upon its intentional acts
exclusion.

5

See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604, 605,

607 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Cal. Law); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d

1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989); Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rash, 740 P.2d 370, 373
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
5 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 433 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App.

1979).
60 This is the minority "Arizona rule."
See, e.g., Globe Am. Cas. Co. v.
Lyons, 641 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) ("derangement of. . . intellect");
Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(voluntary intoxication); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689,
691-93 (Mass. 1992) (further explaining Worchester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day
Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 965 (Mass. 1990)). See Wiley v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 465-67 (3d Cir. 1993), for the application of
Pennsylvania law to and a general discussion of these three judicial approaches to
the "inferred intent" rule when the insured asserts his or her incapacity for an intent
to harm.
61 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text.
62 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying
text.
63 See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, at § 127:26; FISCHER,
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 64-66; LONG ON LIABILITY, supra note 4, at
§ 1IC:02[1]. Although the underlying rationale for applying an "inferred intent"
standard when the sexual abuse victim is a minor may not always apply when the
victim is an adult, a majority of courts nevertheless still apply this "inferred intent"
standard to adult sexual abuse victims, as well as to child sexual abuse victims.
See, e.g., W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Vago, 553 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990);
Rulli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 479 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see
also W. Nat'l Assur. Co. v. Heckler, 719 P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
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C. THE "EXPECTED OR INTENDED" STANDARD APPLIED TO
INSURANCE CLAIMS BY EMPLOYERS AND SUPERVISORS OF
THE ABUSER

Most current insurance coverage claims involve the sexual
molester's employer, supervisor, or religious organization who is allegedly
responsible under a legal doctrine of negligent supervision, negligent
hiring, negligent retention, or under a similar vicarious liability doctrine
based upon negligence principles, rather than based upon the intentional
acts of a sexual molester that were "expected or intended" by the insured.
1. The "Accident" Requirement
Most contemporary homeowners and general liability insurance
policies provide coverage only for accidental"occurrences." For example,
a typical homeowner's policy provides coverage for "bodily injury" or
"property damage" caused by an "occurrence." Occurrence typically is
defined to mean "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions."" General liability
insurance policies likewise cover "bodily injury" or "property damage"
caused by an "occurrence," where an "occurrence" generally is defined as
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured."6 5
An "occurrence" under liability insurance coverage must be an
accidental event. It has been said that an "accident" is an unintended and
unanticipated event, and that it occurs without design, coordination, or
expectation.66 In other words, bodily injury or property damage that is the
("[T]he nature of the act, its forcible and nonconsensual character, and the harm
that certainly results makes the inference of intent no less strong [than in a child
sexual abuse case]").
6 See, e.g., Insurance Services Office Inc. [ISO] Form HO 00 03 04 91
[Homeowners Insurance].
65 See, e.g., Insurance Services Office Inc. [ISO] Form GL 00 00 01 73
[General Liability Insurance] (emphasis in original). See generally LONG ON
LIABILITY, supranote 4, at § 11 C.02[l][a].
66 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996)
(applying Minn. law) ("[An accident is] an unexpected happening without
intention or design."); High Country Assocs. v. N. H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478
(N.H. 1994) ("[W]e interpret 'accident' in the definition of 'occurrence' to mean
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probable, intended, or expected result of the insured's actions is not injury
or damage that was caused by an accidental occurrence. 67 Whether an
accidental event occurred for the purpose of liability insurance coverage
usually is considered from the viewpoint of the tortfeasor-insured."
Decisions outside the realm of sexual abuse claims sometimes have
turned on the "neither expected nor intended" wording in the "occurrence"
clause in determining whether particular forms of misconduct qualified as
an "occurrence." These decisions assume that if the resulting injury was
not expected or intended by the insured, coverage exists even if the
underlying tort, such as gradual pollution or long-term asbestos exposure
arguably was not what ordinary people would refer to as an "accident."69
Such decisions do not treat "accident" as an independent
requirement for an "occurrence" to exist. 70 Rather, they implicitly
conclude that the "expected or intended" clause does not narrow the
meaning of "accident," but instead subsumes the term "accident." A
circumstances ... that were unexpected and unintended from the viewpoint of the
insured."); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting
Co., 923 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Ore. 1996) ([T]he word 'accident' denotes an incident
or occurrence that happened by chance, without design, and contrary to intention
and expectation.") (quoting Finley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 388 P.2d 21, 26 (Or.
1963)).
67
See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Mach. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa.
1988) ("An 'accident' is an event which takes place without having been foreseen,
expected, or anticipated by anyone . . . . If an occurrence is the ordinary and

expected result of the performance of an operation, then it cannot be termed an
accident."); Green Const. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1000,
1002 (W.D. Mo. 1991) ("An 'accident,' as that term is used in standard CGL
policies 'means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen."'), vacated on other
grounds, 975 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Gassaway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 439
S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tenn. 1969) ("[D]efined accident as used in liability insurance
policies as an event not reasonably to be foreseen, unexpected and fortuitous.").
68 See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D.
Nev. 1999); Agoado Realty Corp. v. United Int'l Ins. Co., 733 N.E.2d 213, 216
(N.Y. 2000).
6 E.g., Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d at
396, 400-01 (Tex. 1967) (holding that the negligent application of a pesticide that
had a cumulative toxic effect was an "accident"); see also King v. Dallas Fire Ins.
Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
70 See Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 548 (Md. 1996)
(negligence is deemed "accidental" so long as it causes damage that is unforeseen
or unexpected by the insured).
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number of decisions have followed this analysis in sexual abuse cases,
concluding that damage was not "expected or intended," without
considering further whether what occurred would be regarded by anyone as
an "accident." 7
These decisions, however, do not confront the issue of whether the
term "accident" in the definition of "occurrence" possesses a meaning that
is independent of the "neither expected nor intended" clause. On the other
hand, a significant number of other courts - particularly when addressing
sexual abuse and molestation claims on public policy grounds - have
concluded that the term "accident" does have independent meaning. These
decisions, involving sexual abuse allegations, generally hold that, in
determining whether the sexual misconduct has resulted in an
"occurrence," the threshold question is whether the alleged misconduct can
aptly be regarded as an "accident." If it cannot, there is no further inquiry.
For example, as the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Mountain States
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hauser, recently observed, even if the insured's
negligence in hiring the perpetrator is alleged as a cause of the victim's
injuries, "it was not a risk covered by the policy since it was not an
'accident."' 7 2 Citing decisions from California and New York, the court
held: "Negligent hiring/supervision [of a sexual molester] is not an
'accident."' 73 The court explained further:
[The insured] cites no case where an intentional act of
sexual assault constituted an 'accident" or 'occurrence"
within the meaning of a comprehensive general liability
policy. Rather than resort to "head-spinning judicial
efforts at definition," we conclude that the common
understanding of an "accident" does not include the
[sexual] assault that occur here.74
71 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 913 N.E. 2d 426, 431-32 (Ohio 2009)
(citing cases in other jurisdictions).
72 Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d
56, 60 (Colo. Ct. App.
2009) (citing Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, 756 F.
Supp. 1287, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (cab company employee sexually molested a
passenger)).
7 Id. at 60 (citing Bay Area Cab Lease, 756 F. Supp. at 1289).
74 Id. The Hauser court indicated that absent an "accident" the "standpoint of
the insured-employer" was irrelevant. However, because the insured-employer
allegedly expected injury, the court did not need to decide whether a nonexpectation of injury has any relevance where the underlying event was not an
"accident." Id. at 62.
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An accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed
unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening
occurs which produces the damage, the court added. This analysis
assumes particular importance in "negligent hiring" and "negligent
supervision" cases (as in Hauser) where the policyholder usually asserts
the injuries were neither "expected nor intended" from its standpoint (as
distinguished from the molester's standpoint). The "accident" requirement
also can limit coverage for abuse claims based on alleged
"misrepresentations" by a school or church that children would be safe
from abuse.
It is difficult to predict how influential the Hauser approach will
be. Certainly, the alternate approach - which focuses exclusively on the
"expected or intended" clause - may be unwelcome in those jurisdictions
that claim to place particular emphasis on reading insurance contract
provisions as a whole, so that each provision is afforded meaning. But
75

d.
John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 2009AP2266, 2010 WL
4723728, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010) ("The cause of the plaintiffs'
76

injuries, the misrepresentation by the Archdiocese, cannot be characterized as
accidental. The affirmative representations of safety by the Archdiocese did not
occur by chance, nor was it unforeseen or unintended. . . .").
7 See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 469 F.3d 1158, 1163
(8th Cir. 2006) (applying Ark. law) ("Different clauses of an insurance contract are
read together to harmonize all parts because it is error to give effect to one clause
over another when the two clauses are reconcilable."); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Treesdale, Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Penn. law) ("[Insured]
focuses on phrases that it believes are favorable to its interpretation and ignores all
of the other language that runs counter to its interpretation."); Premcor USA, Inc.
v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 400 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2005), as amended on reh'g,
(Apr. 21, 2005) (applying Ill. law) ("Our task is to determine whether this
provision remains ambiguous when viewed in the context of the entire . . .
policy."); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 454, 455 (6th Cir.
1998) (applying Mich. law) ("Viewed alone, we could not say that the terms
'piracy,' 'idea misappropriation,' or 'unfair competition' could never constitute
patent infringement. However, to draw such an inference when considering these
terms within the policy as a whole construes them too broadly."); Silverball
Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 842 F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (W.D. Ark.
1994), affd, 33 F.3d 1476 (8th Cir. 1994); Am. Guarantee and Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Shel-Ray Underwriters, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 325, 331 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hardnett, 763 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 2000) ("The provisions of the policy
cannot be read in isolation, but, instead, each provision must be read in context
with all other provisions."); Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511,
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those court decisions that conflate "injury neither expected nor intended"
with "accident" seem to read the policy as if it defined "occurrence" as:
An accident, meaning an event, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, causing property damage
or bodily injury that is neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured.
However, this questionable interpretation differs from how the clause
actually reads, which is:
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, resulting in property damage or bodily injury
that is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured.
Thus, in the "occurrence" definition, as it actually reads, the clause
beginning "resulting in" modifies, and narrows, the definition of
"accident." By analogy, the words "that is" within this clause have an
effect much like they would in a sentence reading: "I am looking to buy a

516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287
(Del. 2001) ("[A] court's interpretation of an insurance contact [sic] must rely on a
reading of all of the pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on any
single passage in isolation."); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d
1074, 1076 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) ("[T]he meaning which arises from a particular
portion of an agreement cannot control the meaning of the entire agreement where
such inference runs counter to the agreement's overall scheme or plan.") (citations
omitted); Clarenden Am. Ins. Co. v. 69 W. Wash. Mgmt. LLC, 870 N.E.2d 978,
983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Mich. Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 300 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Northbrook Ins. Co. v. Am.
States Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. W.
Plains Air, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Lindell v. Ruthford,
598 P.2d 616, 618 (Mont. 1979); Commercial Union Assur. Cos. v. Gollan, 394
A.2d 839, 842 (N.H. 1978); Atlas Assur. Co. v. General Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d
850, 852 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Allianz Underwriters
Ins. Co., 749 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Little v. Blue Cross of W.
N.Y., Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Burgess v. N.C. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 261 S.E.2d 234, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ohio 2007); Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Shane & Shane Co., 605 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992);
Eddystone Fire Co. No. I v. Cont'1 Ins. Cos., 425 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. 1981).

HeinOnline -- 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 379 2010-2011

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

380

Vol. 17.2

No one reading this
new car that is neither damaged nor defective.
particular sentence would conclude that the writer had made an offer to
accept an undamaged and non-defective used car. True, "undamaged and
non-defective" are essential characteristics of a new car - just as
"unexpected and unintended injury" are essential characteristics of an
"accident" - but the meaning is quite clear: the car must be new. In the
same interpretive manner, for an "occurrence" to be found, even
unintended injury must still result from an "accident."
As one court has explained, the final clause to the "occurrence"
definition "makes it clear that not all injuries from an intended act will be
excluded, but only those injuries that were intended." 79 And as another
court has correctly observed: "There are two components that must be
shown to establish an 'occurrence' under the policy: (1) an accident; and
(2) personal injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured."80
Courts that give independent meaning to the term "accident"
persuasively conclude that sexual abuse and molestation is not an
"occurrence," even if such an injury was not expected or intended by the
supervisor-insured. In contrast, those judicial decisions that conflate the
two prongs of the "occurrence" definition do not explain how their
particular approach can avoid offending the interpretative rule, emphasized
in so many jurisdictions, that insurance contract provisions must be read as
a whole, giving meaning to the entire document.
Had the "occurrence" definition merely provided that "occurrence"
means "property damage or bodily injury neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured" - omitting the "accident" predicate then whether the act itself was "accidental" would be beside the point. But
given that "occurrence" is defined as "an accident ... resulting in damage

See generally. N. Crossarm, Inc. v. Chem. Specialties, Inc., No. 03-C-415C, 2004 WL 602648 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2004); Faris Mailing v. Dep't of State
Revenue, 512 N.E.2d 480, 485 (Ind. T.C. 1987).
79 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992); see also
United Pac. Co. v. McGuire Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("Since
the word 'event' is not limited to fortuitous happenings, the phrase 'not expected
or intended' cannot be read as language confirming the meaning of the term; ...
the phrase must be regarded as language of limitation, narrowing the coverage
otherwise provided by the word 'event."').
80 Norwalk Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 1132,
1137 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Iowa Iron Works, Inc., 503
N.W.2d 596, 600 (Iowa 1993)).
81 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
78
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neither expected nor intended by the insured, a different intent is apparent.
That is:
1. Something must happen that an
regard as an "accident;"
2. If an "accident" has occurred,
results in bodily injury that is
intended from the standpoint of
coverage.

ordinary person would
there is coverage if it
neither expected nor
the insured claiming

Nevertheless, the courts are still divided between those that grant
meaning to the term "accident" within the "occurrence" definition, and
those that focus exclusively on the "expected or intended" clause. Courts
following the former line of decisions are likely to regard claims arising
from sexual abuse and molestation as falling outside the subject of
insurance coverage, while those courts following the latter line of decisions
must determine whether the insured "expected or intended" the sexual
abuse.82
2.

The "Objective" or "Classic Tort" Standard Applied to
Insurance Claims Arising from Negligent Hiring or
Supervision of a Molester

The crucial underlying legal requirement found in most clergy
negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision cases is
largely based upon whether the priest or clergyman's supervising church,
bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or should have known
of the offender's sexual abuse toward minors.83 The courts have been far
from uniform in addressing this issue. As discussed earlier, 84 for many
claims arising from sexual abuse, whether an "occurrence" has transpired
frequently is determined according to whether the injury caused by the
sexual misconduct was "expected or intended from the viewpoint of the
insured." This test is derived from the final clause of the "occurrence"
definition, requiring that the injury has been neither "expected" nor
"intended."

82

See generally infra Part II.B (involving the molester-insured); infra Part

II.C.2 (involving the supervisor-insured).
83 See supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
84 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Only a few cases across the country have comprehensively
analyzed whether liability insurers can defeat coverage by asserting that,
based on their knowledge of the circumstances, an employer or supervisor
"expected or intended" injury to a sexual molestation victim. 85 One
commentator notes that some courts have applied an objective standardof
what a reasonable supervisor-insured "knew or should have known,"
involving the "substantial probability" that certain consequences would
result; while other courts have applied a subjective standardinvolving what
a particular supervisor-insured actually "knew or believed.", 6
A prime example of this objective standardis the case of Diocese
The particular
of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. et al.87
circumstances surrounding this liability insurance coverage dispute
involved a pedophilic priest, Father Adamson, who subjected several
children to prolonged periods of sexual molestation.
The plaintiff,
Mrozka, sued the Diocese and Archdiocese, alleging they negligently and
recklessly supervised Adamson, allowing Adamson to sexually abuse
Mrozka when he was a minor. Both the Diocese and the Archdiocese
conceded negligence, but disputed their recklessness. "The jury awarded
Mrozka $821,250 in compensatory damages and, finding recklessness,
awarded $2,700,000 in punitive damages," a punitive damage award that
The Minnesota Court of Appeals
was later reduced to $187,000.89
previously had found sufficient evidence "from which the jury could
conclude that Church officials repeatedly and knowingly placed Adamson
in situations where he could sexually abuse boys and then failed to properly
supervise him and disclose his sexual problem."90
During the period Mrozka was sexually abused by Father
Adamson, the Diocese and the Archdiocese had standard occurrence-based
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies from various insurers
covering, among other things, "an accident, including continuous or

85

86

See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 4, at 50.

id.

Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Minn. law).
87

88

See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1407 (D.

Minn. 1994) (detailing facts surrounding Father Adamson's accused sexual
molestation); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
89

89 F.3d at 1389.

90482

N.W.2d at 813.
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repeated exposure to conditions, which results in personal injury ... which
is neither expected nor intendedfrom the standpoint of the insured."9 '
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although "an
insured has a reasonable expectation in securing a CGL policy that the
policy will cover some negligent acts, it does not necessarily follow that all
negligent acts are covered." 92 Accordingly:
[t]he issue then is whether a reasonably prudent person in
the position of the Diocese and the Archdiocese knew or
should have known that Adamson's abuse of Mrozka was
substantially probable as a result of the continuing
exposure caused by their willful indifference. In defining
substantial probability, this court has stated, "[t]he
indications must be strong enough to alert a reasonably
prudent man not only to the possibility of the results
occurring but the indications also must be sufficient to
93
forewarn him that the results are highly likely to occur."
The case therefore was remanded to the federal district court to enter
judgment in accordance with this objective "reasonable person"
94
standard.
On the other hand, an example of a subjective or "particular
insured" standardis found in the case of Roman Catholic Bishop of San
Diego v. Superior Court,95 where a parish priest, Father Omemaga,
sexually abused 15-year-old Jane D. The plaintiff alleged that the Roman
Catholic diocese and church negligently hired, retained, and supervised
Omemaga, since it knew or should have known of his dangerous
propensities as a sexual exploiter of children.
The church moved for summary judgment on the basis
[that] it was not negligent because it did not know and had
no reason to suspect Omemaga posed any risk to
parishioners prior to Jane's report. In essence, the church
argued it had no civil duty to investigate its employees and
the constitutional requirement separating church and state
9' 89 F.3d at 1389-91 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 1392 (emphasis added).
93 Id at 1391 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
94 Id. at 1399.
9 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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barred Jane's civil action for negligent hiring and
supervision of a priest. 96
As evidence of negligent hiring and negligent supervision of Father
Omemaga, the plaintiff submitted Bishop Robert Brom's interrogatory
response stating that "depending on whether a priest is new to the Diocese
or whether he is known within the Diocese, the Chancellor of the Diocese
may ask priests ... whether they have any past or present problems with
their celibacy, and whether anyone has ever made a claim of sexual
misconduct against them." And "[a]lthough there were no detailed
guidelines how a priest demonstrates his fitness," Father Thomas Doyle, a
canon law expert, and an expert in the field of sexual abuse of children by
clergy, testified "it is expected that a host bishop make specific inquiries as
to the priest's background, his work record, and his character" and "Doyle
expected bishops to be 'much more careful and even scrupulous when
investigating the qualifications of priests who will work in their
dioceses."9 Moreover, there was also evidence that Omemaga had two
prior sexual relationships in the Philippines, and one sexual relationship in
San Diego with a parishioner, and Jane's attorney argued that the church
was negligent in hiring Omemaga because, as part of the screening process,
the church failed to ask him "whether he had problems with his vows of
celibacy." 98
Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeal observed that Jane D.
did not have an actionable negligent hiring, negligent retention, or
negligent supervision claim against the Diocese under a subjective
"particular insured" standard. Opined the court: "Even if the church had
learned of Omemaga's prior sexual affairs with adults, it is illogical to
conclude the church should have anticipated Omemaga would commit
sexual crimes on a minor." 99 The decision demonstrates how the subjective
standard varies from the objective standard exemplified in cases such as
Diocese of Winona. As one commentator notes, in jurisdictions that apply
9

Id. at 400-01.

97 Id. at 403.
9 Id. at 401, 405.

9 Id. at 405. But query: Why is it so "illogical" that a priest who has broken
his vow of celibacy with adults may also break his vow of celibacy with minors as
well? See also Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 79 Cal.

Rtpr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in an action for negligent retention
and negligent supervision of a priest who sexually molested a child, the
archdiocese failed to warn the victim of the priest's propensity for engaging in
sexual misconduct with boys).
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this subjective standard,"even the egregious facts in Diocese of Winona
likely would not be sufficient to trigger the expected or intended exclusion"
to liability insurance coverage."0
Which is the better-reasoned interpretive approach-the objective
standard as illustrated in the Diocese of Winona case, supra, or the
subjective standardas illustrated in the Bishop ofSan Diego case, supra?
It is submitted that the objective standard clearly is the betterreasoned interpretive approach for four compelling reasons:
First, the claims of negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention brought against church organizations and their
supervisors for the sexual abuse of minors by priests or other clergymen all
sound in negligence which traditionally is based upon an objective
"reasonable person" standard of care.'o' Moreover, in a liability insurance
context involving claims of negligence, a court generally applies an "eight
corners rule"-that is, the court will compare the "four corners" of the
underlying tort complaint with the "four corners" of the insurance policy to
determine coverage. 0 2
Second, the "objective" or "classic tort" standard for determining
intentional acts in liability insurance coverage disputes, or alternately the
"inferred intent" standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases, is
generally recognized in an overwhelming majority of states as opposed to
the minority "subjective" or "particular insured" standard, based upon
strong public policy reasons. 1o3
Third, a substantial majority of courts have now recognized that the
crucial underlying requirement in negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
negligent supervision of clergy cases largely is based upon whether the
priest or clergyman's supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other

100 Weinstein, supra note 4, at 50.
101 The law of negligence generally

imposes on each person an obligation to
conform to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence standard, an objective
standard that is now well-established in American negligence law. See, e.g., W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 258
(2000).
102 See, e.g., Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(finding no duty to defend the insured in a sexual molestation case).
103 See generally infra Part II.B.
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religious organization knew or should have known of the sexual offender's
abuse toward minors-which, again, is an objective standard.'0
Fourth, and of primary importance, the crucial causation
requirement in both tort law and insurance contract law also requires the
application of an objective "efficient or predominant cause" interpretive
analysis, as is discussed in more detail directly below.
3. Reassessing the Crucial Causation Requirement in
Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes Involving Sexual
Abuse of Minors
The causationrequirementis a crucial factor in both tort lawtos and
insurance law, 06 especially involving liability insurance coverage disputes.
104 See Cooke, supra note 4, at 1063 ("If a reasonably prudent person in the
position of the Church would expect or should expect that an employee is a danger
to innocent life, the church should bear responsibility for all resulting liability.").
105 According to Professor William Lloyd Prosser, to establish a bonafide tort
action sounding in negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) that the
defendant owed plaintiff a duty of due care to act in a reasonable manner toward
the plaintiff; (2) that defendant breached this duty of due care to the plaintiff; (3)
that defendant's acts were the causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the resulting injury; that is to say, it was the cause in fact and the proximate
cause of plaintiffs injury or loss; and (4) actual damage or loss occurred to the
plaintiff as a result of defendant's actions. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 101, at
164-65. The proposed RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. b (2010) states
that there are five elements to any prima facie case in negligence: (1) "duty"; (2)
"failure to exercise reasonable care"; (3) "factualcause"; (4) "physical harm"; and
(5) "harm within the scope of liability (which historically has been called

'proximate cause')" (emphasis added).
106 In an insurance law context, Professor Banks McDowell argues that the
following four factors need to be considered: (1) the coverage provisions of an

insurance policy; (2) the occurrence of the event; (3) the loss or damage; and (4)

the causal "connector" between the event and the loss. Banks McDowell,
Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569, 575 (1988)
(emphasis added). McDowell goes on to state that causation "should be limited to
the connector between what, consistent with insurance terminology, may be called
an 'occurrence,' and the loss suffered by the insured . . . ." Id. at 575-76. See also
Sidney I. Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10 AM. Bus. L.J. 33, 35-36

(1972) ("The insurance rule is that only the proximate cause of the loss, and not the
remote cause, is to be regarded in determining whether recovery may be had under
an insurance policy, and the loss must have been proximately caused by a peril
insured against. . . . The proximate cause of loss or damage to an insured's

property or injury to his person is not necessarily the last link in the chain of
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In an insurance law context, the courts are split on whether to apply
causation rules recognizing either: (1) the cause nearest the loss;10 7 or (2)
the efficient or predominant cause of the loss.'os As one of the authors of
this article previously has observed:
A growing number of American courts ... have rejected a

strict immediate cause rule in favor of an efficient or
dominant proximate cause rule, analogous to a tort-based
proximate cause rule, in order to validate the reasonable
expectations of the insured policyholder to coverage.
Under this reasonable expectations hybrid of tort and
contract causation law, there will be coverage if a risk of
loss that is specifically insured against in the insurance
policy sets in motion, in an unbroken causal sequence, the
events that cause the ultimate loss, even though the last
cause in the chain of causation is an excluded
immediate
09

cause.1

preceding events, but the procuring, efficient cause from which the effect might be
to follow without concurrence of any unforeseen circumstances.").
expected
10 7 See. e.g., Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263
U.S.
487, 492 (1924) (involving a war risk marine insurance policy) ("[T]he common
understanding is that in construing these [insurance] policies we are not to take
broad views but generally are to stop our inquiries with the cause nearest to the
loss."); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989,

1007 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying N.Y. law) (involving aviation insurance) ("These
cases establish a mechanical test of proximate causation for insurance cases, a test
that looks only to the 'causes nearest to the loss."'). See also Bruener v. Turin City
Fire Ins. Co., 222 P.2d 833, 834-35 (Wash. 1950) (involving automobile
insurance) (similar holding), overruled by Graham v. Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983) (involving a homeowners insurance coverage
dispute) (adopted the efficient or predominant proximate cause rule).
1os See, e.g., TNT Speed & Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d
731, 733 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Mo. law) (involving commercial property
insurance); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667 (Vt. 1997)
(involving automobile insurance). See generally Stempel, supra note 7, § 7.02;
Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, § 67[b].
109 Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation "Riddles ", 43 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2007) (citing as authority Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081 (Wash.
1983) (involving homeowners insurance)). See also John Drennon & Sons Co. v.
N.H. Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (involving machinery and
equipment insurance).
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This is especially true with liability insurance coverage issues,
since in order to determine
whether an insurer has a duty to defend [or provide
coverage for] its insured in a lawsuit, a court should
generally apply an "eight corners rule"-that is, the court
should compare the four corners of the underlying tort
complaint with the four corners of the insurance policy and
determine whether the facts alleged in the underlying
complaint fall within, or potentially within, the insurance
policy's coverage."1 0
Next, this crucial causation "connector" requires proof by the
plaintiff of the probability of harm-rather than a mere "possibility" of
harm-based upon defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff."'
Finally, when two or more defendants actively cause the plaintiff
harm, most courts will apply a "substantial factor" test, which holds that
those defendants who were a "substantial factor" and constituted the
"efficient or predominant cause" of the ultimate harm to the plaintiff,
within an unbroken casual chain of events, will be the cause-in-fact and the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 112 This "efficient or predominant
If the clergy sexual abuse was the "efficient or predominant cause" of the
injury, and if it is excluded from coverage under an intentional acts exclusion in
the policy, then the insured will not be able to recover under the liability insurance
policy. This same result would also occur under "the cause nearest the loss"
interpretive analysis.
110 Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding
there was no duty to defend the insured in a sexual molestation action).
" See generally Keeton, supra note 101, at 269-72; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 430-433 (1965). See, e.g., Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire &
Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1391 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Minn. law) ("The issue
then is whether a reasonably prudent person in the position of the Diocese and the
Archdiocese knew or should have known that Adamson's abuse of Mrozka was
substantially probable as a result of the continuing [clergy sexual abuse] exposure
caused by their willful indifference. In defining substantial probability, this court
has stated, '[t]he indications must be strong enough to alert a reasonably prudent
man not only to the possibility of the results occurring but the indications also must
be sufficient to forewarn him that the results are highly likely to occur."') (citations
omitted).
112 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 432(2), 433, 435

(1965). See generally Dobbs, supra note 101, at 414-17, 447-5 1; Keeton, supra
note 101, at 263-68.
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cause" analysis is recognized in an insurance law context as well.H3 But in
a liability insurance context, what "efficient or predominant cause" would
(or would not) constitute an "occurrence" in a causal chain of events
involving more than one defendant?
Since few cases to date have comprehensively analyzed whether
liability insurers can defeat coverage by asserting that a church
organization, employer, or supervisor negligently "knew or should have
known" of the "expected or intended" injuries to a sexual molestation
victim initially caused by a priest or clergyman, especially from a
necessary causation perspective, we need to analyze some analogous
liability insurance cases dealing with this crucial causationrequirement.
For example, in the analogous case of Farmers Alliance Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Salazar,114 a homeowner's insurer brought a declaratory
judgment action, seeking judicial determination that it had no obligation to
defend or indemnify either the insured son, Manuel Corrales, for his
negligent entrustment of his gun to a fellow gang member, or the insured
mother, Ofelia Salazar, for her negligent supervision of her 16-year-old son
Manuel, based on wrongful death claims arising out of her son's
participation in the murder of another boy, Thomas Byus. 15
The insurance company's "duty to defend and indemnify Ms.
Salazar and Manuel Corrales turns on whether Thomas Byus's death was a
'bodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence"' under the homeowners'

liability insurance coverage. Farmers Alliance Insurance Company argued
that the murder of Thomas Byus, by firing the bullet into his head, was the
event that must qualify as an "occurrence." Byus's administrator in this
wrongful death action, however, "asks us to cast our focus further up the
causal chain to Ms. Salazar's negligent supervision of Manuel and
Manuel's negligent entrustment of the murder weapon to Jacob De

LaCruz."I 16
In a case of first impression, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
applying Oklahoma law, stated:
Our search for "occurrence" policy case law addressing a
causal chain that begins with a negligent act or omission
"3 See generally Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, § 67[b]; Stempel, supra
note 7, § 7.02; see also Keeton, supra note 100, § 82 (Liability Insurance and its
Impact on Tort Law).
114 77 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Okla. law).

"' Id. at 1293-94.
16

Id. at 1295.
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and ends with an intentional tort has uncovered the
decisional equivalent of a famine. We have located no
cases addressing the issue facing us today. Therefore, we
begin our analysis with cases that might help by analogy or
Of the scores of decisions interpreting
deduction.
"occurrence" policies, two categories of cases prove
particularly instructive. The first category answers the
question of when an "occurrence" happens, and the second
focuses on where."17
The court -then discussed the generally prevailing rule, recognized
by most courts, that "the time of an 'occurrence' generally is determined by
'the time the complaining party was actually damaged,"' and "the location
of an 'occurrence' is determined by the place where the injury happened; it
does not matter that a precipitating event took place elsewhere."' 18
Although these cases did not address the court's causal link issue directly,
the court found their reasoning to be dispositive. Accordingly, the court
held in determining whether a bodily injury was "'caused by an
occurrence' the question of whether there was an 'occurrence' should be
resolved by focusing on the injury and its immediately attendant causative
circumstances."" 9
Based upon the facts of this particular case, the "occurrence" was
when and where Jacob De La Cruz murdered Thomas Byus, which was an
intentional act, and therefore it could not qualify as an "accident . . . [that

was] neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."l 20
Consequently, the court concluded that it "need not reach the issue of
whether Ms. Salazar or Manuel Corrales actually intended or expected
Thomas Byus's death, because intentional murder is not 'an accident'
under the insurance policy's 'occurrence' provision." 1 21
This same legal argument might also be applied in a liability
insurance context when a priest or clergyman intentionally sexually abuses

' 7 Id.
"' Id. at 1296 (citation omitted).

12o Salazar, 77 F.3d at 1297.

Id. Although the court did not directly address the negligent supervision
allegation involving Ms. Salazar in this particular case, the court may also have
utilized the same causation analysis found in analogous cases interpreting "Liquor
Liability Exclusions" or "Assault and Battery Exclusions" as discussed below. See
supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
121
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a minor, which clearly is not an "accidental" occurrence under the policy
coverage provisions.122
Other analogous cases have dealt with "Liquor Liability
Exclusions" or "Assault and Battery Exclusions," which are conceptually
similar to the "Intentional Act Exclusions" involved in clergy sexual abuse
claims. For example, in the case of Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Ted's
Tavern, Inc.,123 a tavern's commercial general liability (CGL) insurance
policy contained an exclusion-exclusion 2(c)-concerning bodily injury
resulting from causing or contributing to the intoxication of a person, or
furnishing alcoholic drinks to someone who was under the influence of
alcohol.12 4 When a motorist was killed by a drunk patron, who was driving
home from the tavern, the personal representative of the deceased motorist
brought a wrongful death action against the tavern's liability insurance
carrier, arguing that the Ted's Tavern and its employees were liable under
the CGL policy for their negligent hiring, negligence training, and
negligent supervision, rather than coming under the policy's liquor liability
exclusion 2(c). But the Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed with the
plaintiff's argument, based upon relevant legal causationprinciples:
Regardless of the theories of liability a resourceful
attorney may fashion from the circumstances of this case,
the allegations [of negligently hiring, training, and
are general
supervising the tavern employees]
"rephrasings" of the core negligence claim for
causing/contributing to [the patron's] drunk driving. The
events outlined in [the plaintiffs complaint] simply are
not wholly independent of "carelessly and negligently"
serving and continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to [the
impaired patron] when the defendants knew or should have
known he was intoxicated and soon thereafter could be
driving drunk. To the contrary, the... negligent hiring,
training, and supervision are so inextricably intertwined
with the underlying negligence [under the liquor liability
exclusion] that there is no independent act that would
avoid exclusion 2(c). Hence, while a valiant effort to
procure coverage, the creative pleadings of [negligent
hiring, negligent training, and negligent supervision of the
122

See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
853 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
124 I. at 978.
123
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employees] cannot hide the reality that the immediate and
efficient cause of the injuries was drunk driving
precipitated by the negligent service of alcohol. As such,
exclusion 2(c) precludes coverage.125
Thus, the Ted's Tavern court adopted an "efficient or predominant
cause" analysis, where the liquor liability exclusion-exclusion 2(c)barred any recovery from the liability insurance company, since the related
allegations of negligent hiring, negligent training, and negligent
supervision were not wholly independent of and were inextricably
intertwined with, the liquor liability exclusion.
Allegations of misconduct have been deemed to be
"interdependent" with a negligence claim when the negligence claim
incorporated the facts alleged to support deliberate misconduct.126 Thus,
for example, if Count I of the complaint alleges that the insured knew the
molester presented a high level of risk of injury to children, and Count II of
the complaint "incorporates and realleges" the facts set forth in Count I,
then the court may conclude that the "negligence" count reflects an
"expectation" of harm as well.
This holding is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions as
well.127 A Delaware court, for example, considered a case in which,
following the forcible removal of a patron from an amusement park, the
patron sued the park alleging assault, battery, false imprisonment, and
'injury with ill will, intent to injure or malice," and also pled "negligent
supervision."l28 The court observed: "where negligence claims against an
employer such as negligent hiring, negligent training, and negligent
entrustment, are related to and interdependent on the intentional
misconduct of an employee, the "ultimate question" for coverage purposes
is whether the employee's intentional misconduct itself falls within the
definition of 'occurrence."' Likewise, a Missouri court observed, in an
action against a bar owner for injuries inflicted by intoxicated patrons, that:
Id. at 983 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Scottsdale Ins. Co.
v. Lankford, No. 07C-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL 4150212 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 21,
2007), aff'd, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008) (similar holding).
126 See, e.g., Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 666
S.E.2d 897, 900 (S.C. 2008).
127 See Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Huttu, No. 4:06CV67TSLLAA, 2007 WL 188661, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 23, 2007).
125

128 TIG Ins. Co. v. Premier Parks, No. Civ.A02C04126JRS, 2004 WL 728858
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004).
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The damages arise from the assault and battery. Without
the underlying assault and battery, there would have been
no injury and therefore no basis for plaintiffs' action
against Harverfield for negligence. The assault and battery
and Haverfield's negligence are not mutually exclusive;
rather the acts are related and interdependent.12 9
Courts in Texas have applied this doctrine in several other cases as well.13 0
When a supervisor's liability is stated to be on account of its own
negligence, but this negligence is alleged to be interrelated with deliberate
misconduct, the deliberate misconduct, according to these courts, becomes
determinative. 131 When the negligent hiring or negligent supervision
claims require "proof of misconduct" by the offender, the only question is
whether the offender's acts are covered under the definition of

"occurrence."

32

Accordingly, an emerging line of cases persuasively hold that
when the insured's liability is "related to and interdependent on other
tortious activities," the nature of that other tortious activity will determine
whether the insurance policy covers the insured supervisor.133 In Mt.
Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Stagebands, for example, claims of "negligent
design" (of a parking lot) did not permit a finding that injury was expected
or intended. The court observed:
There is no question Cortes's injuries were caused by the
gun-shot - even if the parking layout was an after-the-fact
contributing and worsening cause. In sum, the fact that
[the insureds'] parking design negligence may have

Hunt v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
See State Farm Lloyds v. Borum, 53 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2001); Folsom
Invs. Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 265 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App. 2000).
'"' Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 87 (5th Cir. 1997)
(applying Tex. law) (citing to N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336
(5th Cir. 1996) (applying Tex. law)).
129

13 0

132

id.

See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 1998)
(applying Tex. law); Cornhill, 106 F.3d at 87 (no duty to defend employer for
negligent hiring and failure to provide safe workplace where employee sexually
harassed another employee); cf Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Stagebands Inc.,
636 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. R.I. 2009).
133
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affected [the victim] after he was shot does not make it
unrelated and independent of the assault.'3 4
When courts have applied this analysis to negligent supervision claims in
the context of sexual abuse and molestation, they have held that the
resulting injury was not an "occurrence" within the meaning of a general
liability insurance policy:
If [the perpetrator] had not sexually molested the Isbell
daughters, Linda Isbell would have no claim for damages
Thus, we find [her]
against [the mother-defendant].
liability to be 'related to and interdependent on' the
Because [the
tortious acts of [the perpetrator].
perpetrator's] underlying acts are not encompassed within
the definition of 'occurrence,' [the insurer] has no duty to
defend."'
These decisions reason that negligent hiring and supervision, in and of
themselves, are not actionable, and hence immaterial, absent the nonaccidental act of molestation.
Other cases are in accord with this persuasive and compelling
causation analysis. For example, in the case of Terra Nova Insurance Co. v.
Nanticoke Pines, Ltd.,"3 a liability insurer brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify its
insured tavern keeper for claims asserted by Kevin Gibbs, who was shot by
the tavern's security officer, John Hargett. The plaintiff argued that the
liability insurance coverage was premised on the negligent hiring and the
negligent supervision of the tavern's security guard under the doctrine of
respondeatsuperior.13 ' The insurer argued, however, that it was not liable
under its "assault and battery" exclusion in the policy.
The federal district court, applying Delaware law, held that:

134 Stagebands, 636
135 Am. Nat. Gen.

F. Supp. 2d. at 148-49.
Ins. Cos. v. Ryan, 274 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 2001)
(applying Tex. law); accordW. Am. Ins. Co. v. Embry, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV-47-H,
2005 WL 1026185 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2005); Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard,
518 N.W.2d 179, 184 (N.D. 1994).
13

743 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1990).

' Id. at 294.
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based on the assault and battery exclusion, the complaint
does not allege a risk covered by the policy.... [T]he plain
language of the exclusion bars coverage for any claim
based on assault and battery....All the issues the complaint
raises about Nanticoke's negligence and recklessness
[including allegations of negligent hiring and negligent
supervision] concern conduct of Nanticoke that helped
make the assault possible, and are thus fundamentally
premised on the assault itself'3 8

Delaware's "fundamentally premised" causation analysis is
essentially the same as the "efficient or predominant cause" analysis
adopted in the Ted's Tavern case, supra,139 and a number of other cases
also are in accord with this generally accepted causation analysis.14 0
On the other hand, policyholders might contend that the "expected
or intended" clause is not offended by affording coverage to a supervisorinsured, given that, in such a case, "the insured" claiming coverage is not
the perpetrator. The Terra Nova court noted, without deciding, this
particular distinction.141 Also, an Ohio court recently opined: "[T]orts like
negligent supervision, hiring, retention, and entrustment are separate and
distinct from the related intentional torts (committed by other actors) that
make the negligent torts actionable. Thus, in determining whether a policy
exclusion precludes coverage for that negligent act, we must examine the
injuries arising from the negligent act on their own accord, not as part of
the intentional act." 42 The court reasoned that the negligent act, standing
alone, was the "occurrence."
Insurers might respond that, given the inevitable presence of
supervisors in connection with any such claim under a commercial liability
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Lankford, No. 07C-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL
4150212, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007), aff'd, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008).
140 See, e.g., Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Thee Kandy Store
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 476,
478 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("Regardless of the language of the allegations, the original
138
139

cause of the harm arose from an alleged assault and battery"); Terra Nova Ins. Co.
v. North Carolina Ted, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (similar
holding); see generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Effect of Assault and Battery Exclusion in Liability Insurance Policy at Issue,
44 A.L.R. 5TH 91 (1996) (reporting that the vast majority of cases are in accord
with this general causation principle).
141 Nanticoke Pines, 743 F. Supp. at 298 n. 9.
142 Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d
426,434 (Ohio 2009).
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policy issued to an organization, the "fundamentally premised" doctrine
properly serves to avoid nullifying the "expected or intended" clause.
Further, courts applying the "fundamentally premised doctrine" to
exclusions, consistently have supported their decisions as necessary to
defeat "artful pleading" by underlying plaintiffs.14 3 As stated in a decision
recently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Lankford v. Scottsdale
Insurance Co., "[t]he purpose of Delaware's 'fundamentally premised'
analysis is to prevent an injured party from circumventing the clear terms
of an insurance policy by allying with the insured and by fashioning
expansive theories of liability."'" The Lankford court cited an American
Law Reports annotation's recognition of "the anomalous legal posture of
an insured and a victim, adversaries in one case, siding against an insurer
seeking to apply an ... exclusion to the litigated claims."l 45
In Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Lajoie, for example, the
Vermont Supreme Court rejected a claim for "negligent infliction of
emotional distress" arising from the insured's alleged sexual abuse of a
minor as "simply a disingenuous attempt to create a factual dispute."l 4 6
Courts should seek to prevent the absurdity, and possible fraud upon the
court, that might result if the law were to allow a superficial claim of
"negligence" to supersede factual allegations that reveal intentional and
deliberate conduct by the insured.147
Accordingly, this "efficient or predominant cause" interpretive
analysis may be applied-and, indeed, should be applied-to clergy sexual
abuse claims. For example, a number of courts have held that various
churches, bishops, dioceses, and other religious organizations may be held
tortiously liable for their negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or
negligent retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman if the church,
bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or should have known
of the priest's or clergyman's sexual misconduct.14 8 But in a liability
insurance context, if this negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or
negligent retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman was so
inextricably intertwined with, interdependent, and not independent of, the
priest or clergyman's sexual misconduct-which was excluded under the
See, e.g., Winbush, supra note 140.
144 See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Lankford, No. 076-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL
4150212, at *8 (Del. Super. 2007), aff'd, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008).
145 Id. at *8 n.47 (citing Winbush, supra note 140, at 91).
146 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lajoie, 661 A.2d 85, 86 (Vt. 1995).
147 The distinction between actual "negligence" and the mere labeling of a
143

claim as "negligence" is discussed in further detail below. See infra Part II.E.
148 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 396 2010-2011

2011

CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

397

liability insurance policy's intentional act exclusion, and which was the
"efficient or predominant cause" of the plaintiffs sexual abuse claim-then
the supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization
should not be covered by its liability insurer under generally accepted tort
and insurance law cause-in-fact and proximate cause causation
49
principles.1
Consequently, if a priest or clergyman sexually abuses a minor,
this sexual abuse generally will be barred under a liability insurance
policy's "expected or intended" exclusion, under either an objective or
"classic tort" analysis, 50 or under an "inferred intent" standard as applied
to child sexual abuse cases."' Likewise, if a supervisory church, diocese,
bishop, or other religious organization objectively knew or should have
known of the priest's or clergyman's sexual abuse of a minor-which was
the "efficient or predominant cause" of the minor's sexual abuse claimand this negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the sexually abusive
priest or clergyman was connected to and was not independentfrom the
priest or clergyman's sexual misconduct, then liability insurance should not
cover such negligence under relevant cause-in-fact and proximate cause
principles either.
4. What is "Expected" Injury, and Does "Expected" have a
Meaning Independent from "Intended"?
As discussed above, the question whether an insured "intended"
injury has been regarded by a significant number of courts as governed by
an "objective" standard or, with children, an "inferred intent" standard.'15 2
If a reasonable person would have foreseen injury, then, consistent with tort
law precedent, the insured's state of mind will be deemed to reflect intent.

149 See supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Diocese of
Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying
Minn. law); see also Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002)
(holding that a separate negligent supervision claim was not covered since it was
causally connected to the sexual molestation of a child, which was excluded from
coverage under the parties' homeowners insurance policy). This same result
would apply if a particular jurisdiction applies a more traditional "cause nearest the
loss" interpretive analysis, rather than applying the modem and majority "efficient
or predominant cause" interpretive analysis.
1so See supranotes 41-44 and accompanying text.
1 See supranotes 56-63 and accompanying
text.

152 See infra Part II.B.
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In interpreting "expected" or "intended" provisions, however, the
"expected" prong, inexplicably, is often overlooked. Yet it is as much an
interpretive hurdle to a finding of coverage as the requirement that the
injury would not have been "intended." Thus, even when the injury was
not "intended," a second question still remains: If injury was not
"intended," might it nevertheless have been "expected"? The answer is
"yes," when supported by operative facts, according to those courts that
have given independent meaning to both terms: i.e., "expected," as well as
"intended."
Some decisions, it should be noted, have deemed "expected" to be
synonymous with "intended."'s A few courts have assumed there is no
difference between the terms "expected" and "intended" in determining
whether the "intentional acts exclusion" applies.154 Other courts, however,
have concluded that the terms "expected" and "intended" are not
synonymous. 55 It has been observed: "Determining a person's expectation
involves a different inquiry than does determining his or her intent."'5 6 If
only "intention" needed to be considered, the use of the word 'expected'
would be mere surplusage, which is a result to be avoided in
interpretation.""'
Generally speaking, an insured "expects an injury if he or she is
subjectively aware that injury is substantially certain to result.""
153 See, e.g., Poston v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982).
154 See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So.2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1974); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1979); State v. Glens Falls

Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1979); Poston v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9
(Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
'" See, e.g., Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murry, 370 N.E.2d 295, 299-300 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1977) (pointing out that if "intended" and "expected" were synonymous,
there would be no point in including them both within the language of the
intentional act exclusion); see also Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d
1052 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Iowa law); Armstrong Cleaners, Inc. v. Erie Ins.
Exch., 364 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins.
Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Nw. Nat. Cas. Co. v.
Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979); Seymour v. Lenoir Cnty., 567 S.E.2d 799

(N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Abrams v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 67 P.3d 931 (Or. 2003).
156 N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 156, 158 (Vt. 2001) (citing City of
Burlington v. Ass'n of Gas and Electric Ins. Serv., LTD., 751 A.2d 284, 288 (Vt.
2000)); Espinet v. Horvath, 597 A.2d 307, 310 (Vt. 1991).
11 Horvath, 597 A.2d at 310; see also Phalen, 597 P.2d at 726.
15 Perron,777 A.2d at 158 (citing Horvath, 597 A.2d at 310); accord Jenkins
v. Koester, No. 268175 2007 WL 2429846, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007);
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However, given that the insured rarely will concede that he or she expected
harm, the analysis usually turns on whether, objectively, the insured should
be regarded as having expected injury." 9 The Eighth Circuit, in Diocese of
Winona defined this standard as follows:
[U]nder the substantially probable test ... if an insured is

alerted to the problem, its cause, and knows or should have
known of the likelihood of the problem's recurrence, it
cannot ignore such problem and then look to its insurer to
reimburse it for the liability incurred by reason of such
inaction. 160
Thus, even in jurisdictions that have not expressly recognized an
objective test for "intended" injury, coverage may be barred for insureds
that did not wish harm to anyone, if the insured expected such injury. A
prominent case concerning expectation of harm in the context of insurance
where injury is a "substantial probability" is the Eighth Circuit's decision
in City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. There, the court
held that "substantial probability" means "[t]he indications must be strong
enough to alert a reasonably prudent man not only to the possibility of the
results occurring, but the indications also must be sufficient to forewarn
him that the results are highly likely to occur."l61 Similarly, California
courts have held that: "[t]he appropriate test for 'expected' damage is
whether the insured knew or believed its conduct was substantially certain
or highly likely to result in that kind of damage."16 2
It is sometimes argued that giving the term "expected" its usual
meaning, and precluding claims where the insured "should have known"
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d. 703, 721-27
(Wash. 1994).
' Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988)
("whether [property damage] was expected is a subjective inquiry, but a subjective
expectation can be inferred from objective evidence that the injury was the natural
and probable result from the act.") .
160 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 (8th
Cir. 1996) (applying Minn. law) (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 1979)); accord Baystate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451
N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (Ill. 1983); cf Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Catholic
Risk Retention Grp., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
16! City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th
Cir. 1979) (applying Neb. law).
162 FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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the harm would occur, cuts too broadly in precluding coverage for a
"negligence" claim. However, in Diocese of Winona, the court explained
that giving meaning to the term "expected" bars coverage only for some,
but not all, negligence claims. "While an insured has a reasonable
expectation in securing a CGL policy that the policy will cover some
negligent acts, it does not necessarily follow that all negligent acts are
covered.... [T]here may be instances when, although an insured was
negligent, she knew or should have known that resulting damage was
expected." 63 Ordinary negligence has not been deemed sufficient reason
to conclude that sexual abuse was "expected" by a supervisor or employer.
In such instances, the "expected" prong has not been deemed to bar
coverage.'6
The requisite level of "expectation" was well-explained in a
homeowners insurance case in which the underlying complaint alleged that
the parents had knowledge of their son's deviant sexual propensities, and
that he was a "continuing danger" to the claimant.16 5 These facts, the court
held, showed that "as competent adults, [the insureds] would have at least
expected harm to result to [the claimants] as a result of their conduct."l 6 6
Similarly, under New Jersey law, if a spouse, even if ignorant of the actual
abuse, has "special reason to know that it was likely to occur," no insurance
coverage exists. "Although the bodily injury for which she was being sued
may have been unintended from her perspective ... it was not unexpected;
consequently, it was not an accident from her perspective and it was
outside the coverage of the policy."l 6 7
In a recent decision, an Ohio court of appeals observed that an
insured's denial of intent to harm was irrelevant when the act in question
was "substantially certain to result in injury." 68 There, the court held:
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1392 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Minn. law) (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714,
163

719 (8th Cir. 1981)).
6 See, e.g., Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Catholic Risk Retention
Grp., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-13 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (distinguishing ordinary

negligence, which may give rise to a covered "occurrence," from gross negligence,
which may not); accord Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bower, No. 1:07 CV 254,
2010 WL 4630486 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2010).
165 W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 498
(W.Va. 2004).
166 Id. at
497.
167 J.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 762 A.2d 1062, 1064 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.
2000) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996)).
168 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, No. L-09-1146, 2010
WL 3610451, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2010).
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Based upon the Oblates' knowledge of Rapp's history and
his need for supervision and ongoing treatment, the
Oblates' decision to give Rapp unfettered access to
Assumption's parishioners, without warning, was
substantially certain to result in additional incidents of
sexual molestation of boys. Accordingly, we find that the
Oblates' actions did not cause accidental injury to Rapp's
VitM169
victim.
"Rather," the court concluded, "the injury to Rapp's victim was expected,
i.e., substantially certain to occur, and, therefore, the Oblates' actions were
70
not 'occurrences' pursuant to CIC's policy."1

Applied in this manner, the "expected" standard is akin to a gross
negligence standard.' 7 ' Thus, where the claimant alleged that the
perpetrator had a history of mistreating and assaulting female employees,
and the supervisor-insured knew of at least one incident where the

perpetrator had assaulted an employee, the court concluded the insured
"knew full well what was potentially going to happen with their son [the
employee-perpetrator] and the female employees and did not care."l 72 The
insurer demonstrated that the perpetrator's "conduct was foreseeable and
not unexpected" on the part of the supervisor. Thus, with a negligent hiring
claim, "foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is a prime factor in the duty
analysis." 7 3 The court concluded: "Under such circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the negligent hiring and supervision ... was an 'occurrence'
or 'accident' within the meaning of the policy."' 74

169

id

no Id.
171 "Ordinary negligence" has been defined as "want of
ordinary care and
diligence" where "gross negligence" is defined as the "want of slight care and
diligence." See Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Catholic Risk Retention Grp.
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
172 Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 58 (Colo. App.
2009).
'7 Id at 61 (citing Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 130
P.3d 1011, 1016 (Colo. 2006)).
174 Id. In light of the high degree of foreseeability required to establish
negligent hiring/supervision, the court indicated that injury in such cases may, by
definition, be "expected" (and thus ineligible for insurance coverage), though the
court did not need to decide the point in light of the allegations that the insured
knew of prior incidents.
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"The terms 'expected' and 'intended' are not synonymous...;
expectation is easier to prove.. .,,175 "Intended" injury will always be
"expected," but "expected" injury may not have been intended. This
distinction between "expected" and "intended" is of the greatest
significance where the insured was not the sexual abuser, and may not have
intended injury. For example, a religious institution might be deemed to
have "expected" its employee to sexually molest minors if that employee
had a significant history of inappropriate conduct concerning minors.
In sum, "expected" appears to present a lower threshold than
"intended," coming into play in circumstances when the insuredsupervisor's error is principally one of omission rather than of commission.
"Injury is 'expected' even when the damages are not accomplished by
design or plan, i.e., not 'intended,' but are 'of such a nature that they should
have been reasonably anticipated (expected) by the insured."' 1 76 As the
Eighth Circuit concluded, "[tihe difference between damages that are
reasonably foreseeable and damages that are substantially probable is one
of degree of expectibility."177
D. DECISIONS

"NEGLIGENT
WHETHER
CONSIDERING
SUPERVISION" CAN EVER BE AN "OCCURRENCE"

A significant number of courts have concluded explicitly or
implicitly that negligent supervision is, by itself, an "occurrence,""' and
such courts will "examine the injuries arising from the negligent act on
their own accord, not as part of the negligent acts."7 9
Decisions holding to the contrary, however, have reasoned that the
tort of negligent supervision requires, as an essential element, damage to a

Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988)
(applying Ill. law).
176 Westfield Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Cmty. Bank & Trust Co.,
804 N.E.2d
601, 608 (Ill. 2003).
175

177 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392
(8th Cir. 1996) (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 719 (8th Cir.
1981)).
178 See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426, 434 (Ohio 2009)
("torts like negligent supervision, hiring, retention, and entrustment are separate
and distinct from the related intentional torts [committed by other actors] that make
the negligent tort actionable.").
179 id
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third party.so "The elements of a claim for negligent hiring are: (1) a
specific tortious act by the employee; (2) the employee's incompetence or
unfitness; (3) the employer's actual or constructive notice of the
employee's incompetency or unfitness; and (4) injury.""' Absent the
fourth element - "injury" - nothing of legal significance has "occurred."
As was said in another context, "negligence in the air, so to speak, will not
do." 82 Hiring, supervision, and retention that fall short of the standard of
care, without causing injury, are of no legal consequence.
A line of decisions reasons that, in cases of negligent supervision
or hiring, the "accident," for purposes of considering whether an
"occurrence" happened, remains the injury-causing event - such as sexual
molestation - rather than any precipitating negligence by the insured. The
term "accident," it has been held, "unambiguously refers to the event
causing the damage, not the earlier [negligent hiring] creating the potential
for future injury."'8 Courts in Illinois and in the Eleventh Circuit have
observed that a claim for negligence against an insured-employer does not
transform a non-accident (sexual molestation) into an accident, even if the
insured-employer did not expect harm.' 84 In SCI Liquidating Corp. v.
HartfordIns. Co., for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that allegations of intentional sexual harassment, assault, and battery
against a manager, which formed the predicate for a claim of "negligent
retention" by the employer, are not 'accidents' and therefore do not
constitute an "occurrence." The insurance coverage inquiry, it has been
held, must "focus on the 'immediately causative circumstances.'' 185
Molestation, a deliberate act, may mean that allegations of mere negligent
supervision are irrelevant, because "[t]he intentional act interrupts the
causal chain between negligent supervision and injury." 86
Canatillo Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 99
F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir.1996) (applying Tex. law).
181 White v. Consolidated Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d
147 (N.C. 2004), rev.
denied, 610 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. 2005).
182 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y.
1928), cited in Cooper
v. Eberly, 508 P. 2d 943 (Kan. 1973).
Maples v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978), cited in Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 161, 162 (Vt. 2001).
18 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nat'l Union, 772 N.E.2d 247, 256 (Ill. 2002); SCI
Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1214-17 (11th Cir.
1999).
18 SCI, 181 F.3d at 1216-17 (applying Ga. law).
186 TIG Ins. Co. v. Premier Parks, No. Civ.A.02CO4126JRS,
2004 WL
728858, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004).
180
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In another case, the court considered a sexual assault lawsuit
brought against the owner of a cab company that had hired a cab driver
who sexually assaulted his customer. The court held that whether or not
the cab company "expected or intended injury" was beside the point. Its
hiring of the molester was not the accident. The cab company's acts or
omissions "merely created the potential for injury ... but was not itself the
cause of the injury." 87 And in a case of negligent supervision against a
woman whose son committed murder, the court reasoned: "[t]hough
myriad other events of an earlier time and different place may have
contributed to the claimed injury, to determine whether there was an
'occurrence' within the meaning of the policy we must focus on those
events directly responsible for the injury., 188
Each of these decisions reasons that hiring a bad actor, such as a
pedophile, may be negligence, but it is not an "accident." Certainly,
negligent hiring may form part of the circumstances contributing to
deliberate injury. Nevertheless, negligent hiring is not an "accident" within
the ordinary use of that word, these courts observe, and therefore "sexual
abuse" claims do not give rise to an "occurrence." As one court opined,
where abuse has been alleged, a negligent supervision claim does not exist
without the damage caused by the sexual abuse. 89
E.

CLAIMS IN WHICH NEGLIGENCE IS PLED ALONGSIDE FACTS
SHOWING ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT: LOOKING
"BEYOND THE LABEL OF NEGLIGENCE"

An issue of critical significance with regard to an insurer's duty to
defend the insured arises when a sexual molestation complaint pleads facts
showing specific knowledge on the part of a religious organization,
consistent with an expectation of harm, but adds a count for
"negligence" as well. Should such a count be regarded as defeating the
expectation of harm reflected by the complaint's other allegations?
A considerable number of decisions acknowledge that when the
complaint alleges facts consistent with an expectation of harm, further
allegations that the insured "should have known" of the potential for injury,
Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
187

188

Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (10th

Cir. 1996).
189 Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 99
F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Tex. law).
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or that the insured acted "negligently and/or intentionally," do not override
factual allegations indicating intent. It has been said that, even when a
complaint pleads a count for negligence, "we must look beyond the label of
negligence to determine if the insurer had a duty to defend."l 90
Not all courts agree, and some have allowed a "negligence"
allegation to override allegations of specific knowledge. A good example
of this methodology is found in the Texas Court of Appeals decision in
Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.1 9'
There, the sexual abuse victim's causes of action against the Diocese
included:
(1) failing to warn of known dangerous propensities;
(2) knowingly breaching and participating in breaches of its
fiduciary duties to plaintiff;
(3) fraud;
(4) acting with malice and conscious indifference; and
(5) conspiring to cover up incidents of priests sexually abusing
minors.
Notwithstanding these allegations, the Complaint also alleged the Diocese
was negligent in hiring and retaining the priest-molester "when it [knew or]
should have known of his dangerous sexual propensities."1 92 Based on the
"should have known" allegation, the court concluded the insurer was
obligated to defend, because the latter allegations did not require the
Diocese to have known about the perpetrator's sexual propensities for the
plaintiff to succeed. "Viewed from the Diocese's viewpoint, if it did not
know of [the perpetrator's] sexual propensities, then his molesting
[plaintiff] was both unexpected and unintentional, and [thus potentially]
within coverage." 93
In contrast, the vast majority of cases considering whether the mere
label of negligence overcomes facts demonstrating a higher level of fault
have concluded that when allegations of negligent supervision are
accompanied by allegations of deliberate misconduct, the supervisor190 Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters, 666 S.E.2d 897, 900 (S.C.
2008) (where insured distributed gambling machines equipped so as to permit
manipulation, thus violating laws protecting the public from excessive gambling,
the allegations failed to support a claim for negligent conduct).
191 Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 133
S.W.3d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
192 Id. at 895.
193 id
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insured is not entitled to coverage. 19 4 Courts long have recognized that the
nature of the liability set forth in the complaint is to be "determined by the
quality and purpose of the transaction as a whole."195 Courts "looking
beyond the label of negligence" examine the "'quality and purpose' of the
complaint as a whole, not simply the use of a word such as
'negligence.' 19 6
In these decisions, the inclusion of a negligence count in the
complaint does not trigger coverage when "the facts alleged in the
complaint are inconsistent with unintentional conduct or injury." 97 The
nature of a tort action, such courts conclude, is not changed merely by
The focus is on the facts alleged
deploying the word, "negligence." 9
99
rather than a label of "negligence."
In this regard, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
observed that the choice of legal theories in the complaint is not important
in determining whether an insurance company has a duty to defend.
Instead, the question is whether the "conduct as alleged in the complaint is
at least arguably within one or more of the categories of wrongdoing that
the policy covers."20 o

Likewise, in C.L. by Guerin v. School Dist. of

e.g., Colony Ins. Co. v. Events Plus, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1156
(D. Ariz. 2008).
195 Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1921).
196 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Moser, No. 4:05CV00979 JLH, 2006 WL 827319, at *4
(E.D. Ark. 2006) (quoting Fisher v. Travelers Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 892 (Ark.
1966)).
197 Serecky v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins., 857 A.2d 775, 781 (Vt. 2004) (citing
TBH ex rel. Howard v. Meyer, 716 A.2d 31, 34 (Vt. 1998)).
198 Fisher v. Travelers Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 892 (Ark. 1966); Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. Proctor, 286 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2003).
194 See,

199 "We must focus on the factual allegations in [the underlying complaint]

and not on the legal theories asserted, and unless the complaint alleges facts within
the coverage of the policies, [the insurer] has no duty to defend of indemnify."
Meyer, 716 A.2d at 34. See also Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pinacol Assur. Co., 425
F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2005); accord Colony Ins. Co. v. Events Plus, Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-55 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("To conclude otherwise would only
allow the parties to render such exclusions essentially meaningless through artful
pleadings and would allow them to circumvent the terms and intent of the policy
and its exclusions."); Link Snacks Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-714-slc, 2009
WL 3380383 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2009).
200

Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d

1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wis. law). See also St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Hausman, 604 N.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) ("We
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Menomonee Falls,20 1 the court concluded that an insurance company was
not obligated to defend an insured against a claim labeled "negligence" in
the complaint, even though the policy - like any standard liability
insurance policy - covered negligent conduct. The court observed that "the
facts alleged involved sexual abuse (which is intentional conduct by
definition)," and thus the complaint did not state a claim that would be
covered by the policy. The legal theory denominated in the complaint was
therefore irrelevant.
This approach may be particularly apt in sexual abuse cases
involving the alleged "negligence" of a supervisor or employer. In such
cases, courts have discounted nominal allegations of negligence when they
are side-by-side with allegations of actual knowledge or purposeful action.
Thus, in an insurance action brought by parents of the alleged molester, the
court held: "Although the word 'negligent' is used in their allegations
against [the parent-insureds], intentional conduct is actually described. For
example, the complaint alleges that Glen and Helen Stanley had actual
knowledge that Jesse possessed deviant sexual propensities and was a
continuing danger to [the victim], but that they permitted him to
continually sexually abuse and sexually exploit [the victim] [as a result of
their conduct]."202 These decisions analyze whether allegations such as
"should have known" override allegations of specific knowledge.
The logic is worth exploring. Consider the following hypothetical
allegations:
The Insured employer:
(1) knew the molester had molested minors before;
(2) knew the molester aimed to molest minors again;
(3) knew and/or should have known the molester was a threat to
minors.
In this example, does the inclusion of "should have known" in the third
allegation mean the insured did not expect molestation? Only if the first
two allegations are (improperly) overlooked. To illustrate, consider
another analogous example:

determine whether insurance coverage exists by focusing on the incident itself and
not the theory of liability.").
201 C.L. and T.W. ex rel. Guerin v. Sch. Dist. of Menomonee Falls, 585
N.W.2d 826, 830 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
202 W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 498 (W. Va. 2004).
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The Apartment Building:
(1) Has its top floor on the eighth floor.
(2) Has an elevator with buttons one through eight.
(3) Contains up to eight, and at least four, stories.
Does the equivocal third paragraph permit the conclusion that the
building is less than eight stories high? Not in light of paragraphs one and
two. So too in the first example above, the equivocal "and/or should have
known" in paragraph three does not mean - in light of paragraphs one and
two - that something other than intentional harm has occurred.
Such cases may be contrasted with the common claim of
"negligence" involving a bouncer or similar employee of an insured tavern
employer, who batters a bar patron, subjecting the insured to liability. In
such cases, when the facts may equally suggest (i) an intent to injure, or (ii)
merely an intent to relocate the patron outside the establishment, courts
have found a potential "occurrence" under liability policies.203 The
difficulty of judging specificity of intent in a situation where persons may
or may not be acting to avoid injuries to third parties, rather than cause
injuries, explains why the "bar patron" cases, with some justification, tend
to find the alleged injury was neither "expected nor intended." 204 It is rare
in such cases to find specific facts demonstrating both expectation of harm
and intent to harm, in contrast to many clergy sexual abuse cases.
F. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS AND "NEGLIGENCE"
Clergy abuse lawsuits in particular often allege a conspiracy among
church officials to conceal, if not to permit, abuse by clergymen. Such
complaints may allege a fact-based pattern of concerted efforts. For
example, allegations against a religious order that supervised a priest
accused of molestation stated that the supervisors:
agreed or otherwise conspired to cover up
incidents of sexual abuse of minors by Salesian
priests and/or educators and to prevent disclosure,
E.g., Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Weiner, 636 A.2d 649 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994); cf Gene's Restaurant, Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 246 (Pa.
203

1988).

See Sans, et al. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 676 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999) (shooting that occurred during a bar fight did not necessarily mean the
shooter "intended" injury).
204
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prosecution and civil litigation including, but not
limited to: failure to report incidents of abuse to
law enforcement or child protection agencies;
denial of abuse [they] had substantiated; aiding
criminal child molesters in evading detection,
arrest and prosecution; allowing criminal child
molesters to cross state and international borders
for purposes of gaining access to uniformed
parents whose innocent children could be sexually
abused; failure to warn; and failure to seek out and
redress the injuries its priests and/or educators had
caused.20 5
Conspiracy allegations do not reflect mere negligence, because the
tort of civil conspiracy involves "actions intended by the insured" and
therefore does not "meet the definition of 'occurrence"' under the policy at
issue." 206 There is no such thing as a "negligent conspiracy." There is,
rather, "a conscious, decision making [sic] element that takes civil
the range of behavior encompassed within the meaning
conspiracies out 2of
07

of 'occurrence."'

For these reasons, conspiracy allegations have generally been fatal
to claims for insurance coverage, even when the underlying complaint
includes allegations of "negligence."20 8
G. THE "BODILY INJURY" REQUIREMENT

Standard commercial general liability policies provide coverage
only for "Personal Injury" or "Bodily Injury." Under such policies, even if
injury was neither "expected nor intended," and even if the injury was the
result of an "accident," there is no coverage unless the claimant suffered
"bodily injury."
Such injury sometimes is defined to mean: "bodily injury or if
arising out of bodily injury, mental anguish." "Bodily Injury" frequently is
205

Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07-2091, 2008 WL 1743436, at *7

(D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2008).
206 State Bancorp Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 483 S.E.2d 228 (W. Va,
1997), quoted in W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 495 (W. Va.
2004).
207 Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376,
387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
208 See
id.
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defined in commercial general liability policies to mean "bodily injury,
sickness, or disease." In contrast, other standard form policies define
"bodily injury" to include mental harm, defining "bodily" or "personal
injury" as "bodily injury, shock, mental anguish, sickness or disease,
including death at any time resulting therefrom."
Sexual abuse claims range from an abuser masturbating while in
proximity to a plaintiff, to instances of penetration, including penetration
resulting in physical damage. Sexual abuse involving clergy has included
penetration by objects, penile or digital penetration, vaginally or anally, as
well as oral copulation. Physical injury sometimes is alleged, though often
complaints allege harm limited to "anxiety, embarrassment, and emotional
distress."
In considering whether the alleged sexual abuse equates to "bodily
injury," a number of courts have concluded that emotional damages arising
from sexual molestation may constitute "bodily injury" under a commercial
liability policy.2 09 These courts have held that bodily touching alone is a
sufficient predicate to support coverage. Other courts, reasoning that
physical injury and physical touching are not synonymous, conclude that
,,210
emotional damage (even if arising from touching) is not "bodily injury.
They have held that bodily injury, including sickness and disease, "does not
include emotional distress, at least where, as here, the distress is not caused
by physical trauma." 2 1 1
Quite a few courts have held that various forms of touching and
fondling in the course of sexual abuse do not constitute "bodily injury." A
2005 federal court decision catalogued insurance coverage cases
nationwide in which plaintiffs' private parts had been grabbed, squeezed or
fondled, yet no "bodily injury" was deemed to have occurred. The court
held: "The phrase 'bodily injury' simply cannot be read as synonymous
with the phrase 'physical contact."' 2 12 In 2008, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals reasoned that "bodily injury" had not occurred where a neighbor
molested a child by squeezing her chest through her clothes, and rubbing
Wayne Twp. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Ind. Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1210
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 F. Supp. 1440, 1443 (S.D.
Fla. 1989); Cnty. of Chemung v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1985).
2 Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Sch., 645 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Va.
1986); Chatton v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 323 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
211 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tozer, 392 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Ind.
law).
209
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his hand up and down her leg.213 These touchings "did not include any
physical injury such as bruises, scrapes, or cuts." Rather, the claim was
confined to "the physical, cognitive or emotional manifestations of the
effects of the sexual touching." 2 14 In insurance cases where the injuries
alleged are purely emotional or mental in nature, a number of courts have
held that "bodily injury" coverage is not available.2 15 In particular, that
reasoning may be difficult to assail when the policy defines "bodily injury"
as "bodily injury, sickness or disease," with no reference to "mental
anguish."
In contrast, physical penetration of the body has been deemed to
be a "violation of the bodily integrity of the victim, and therefore an
infliction of actual physical injury on her, even if not accompanied by
bleeding or broken bones." 2 16 A number of jurisdictions have adopted this
analysis. 1 No court has concluded that physical penetration in the course
of sexual abuse would not represent "bodily injury" for purposes of
insurance coverage.
The decisions that require some actual physical injury, such as
penetration, as a predicate for insurance coverage, may be influenced by
the fact that certain insurance policy forms are available to cover emotional
damages, distress, and mental anguish. Policy forms that do not include
these forms of non-bodily harm more likely will be read to preclude
coverage in the absence of some bodily trauma caused by the sexual abuse.
III.

CONCLUSION

Clergy sexual abuse and molestation of minors constitutes a grave
contemporary social problem. But not all clergy sexual abuse claims can be
213

Hart v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 P.3d 565, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).

214 id.

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mrs. B.G., No. Civ.A. 05-578, 2005 WL
3434137 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (collecting cases).
216 United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Doe, 792 N.E.2d 708,
744-45 (Mass. Ct. App.
2003).
217 See Prof I Staffing-A.B.T.S., Inc. v. Ill. Union
Ins. Co., No. 8:04-CV793T30EAJ, 2005 WL 2290243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2005); Allstate Ins. Co
. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056, 1059-60 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Roefls, 698 F. Supp. 815, 818, 821 (D. Alaska 1987); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v.
M.K., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 417
n.5 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v .Gardipey, 434 N.W.2d 220
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 450 N.W.2d 445 (Wis.
1990).
215
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compensated through liability insurance coverage, which commonly
excludes acts "that are expected or intended from the viewpoint of the
insured."
In a majority of states today, liability insurance coverage for the
molester-insured generally is barred, either under an "objective" or "classic
tort" standard for determining intentional acts, or under an "inferred intent"
standard when applied to child sexual abuse cases.
The courts have not been uniform, however, in how they treat
liability insurance coverage disputes pertaining to the sexual molester's
supervisory employer or religious organization, specifically when the
supervisor-insured is sued for the negligent supervision, employment, or
retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman, rather than based on the
molester's intentionalacts per se.
Some courts have held that an underlying insured "occurrence"
must also be "accidental," and therefore "negligent supervision" of a sexual
molester can never be an "accident."218
Other courts have applied an "objective" or "classic tort"
interpretive standard to liability insurance claims arising out of the
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of a clergyman-molester,
including the prominent Diocese of Winona case.219
It is submitted that the objective Diocese of Winona approach
applied to liability insurance coverage disputes involving supervisoryinsureds of clergy sexual molesters is the better-reasoned interpretive
approach for the following reasons: First, the claims of negligent hiring,
negligent supervision, and negligent retention brought against church
organizations and their supervisors for the sexual abuse of minors by
priests or other clergymen all sound in negligence which traditionally is
based upon an objective "reasonable person" standard of care. Second, this
"objective" or "classic tort" standard for determining intentional acts in
liability insurance coverage disputes, or alternately the "inferred intent"
standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases, is recognized in an
overwhelming majority of states, as opposed to the minority "subjective" or
"particular insured" standard, based upon strong public policy reasons.
218 See, e.g., Mountain States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 60 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2009). But see contra Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d
426 (Ohio 2009) (holding that torts like negligent supervision, hiring, and retention
are separate and distinct from the related intentional torts committed by the
original actor, such as a priest or clergyman-molester).
219 See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Minn. law).
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Third, a substantial majority of courts now recognize that the crucial
underlying requirement in negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention cases is based upon whether the priest of clergyman's
supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or
should have known of the sexual offender's abuse toward minors-which,
again, is an objective standard. Fourth, and of primary importance, the
crucial causation requirement in both tort law and insurance contract law
also requires the application of an objective "efficient or predominant
cause" interpretive analysis. Thus, in a liability insurance context, if the
negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or negligent retention of a sexually
abusive priest or clergyman was so inextricably intertwined with, and not
independent of the priest or clergyman's sexual misconduct, then the
supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization should
not be covered under generally accepted tort and insurance law causation
principles.
In sum, the most commonly litigated issue, as discussed at length
in this article, is whether injury resulting from clergy sexual abuse and
molestation was "intended" or "expected" by the molester-insured and the
It is our conclusion that determining this issue
supervisor-insured.
according to the "objective" insured test is the better-reasoned approach,
and is most in accord with generally accepted tort law and insurance law
principles. This means that when the supervisor-insured has knowledge
that harm was substantially likely to occur to the sexual abuse victim, then
coverage usually will be deemed to have been "intended." However, this
would normally involve a gross negligence standard, rather than an
ordinary negligence standard, for precluding coverage.
The "intent" interpretive issue has dominated many liability
insurance coverage disputes, sometimes to the exclusion of other important
interpretive issues raised by liability insurance policy provisions. The most
important of these, which may need to be resolved regardless of whether an
insured "intended" injury or not, are: (1) whether the insured "expected"
injury; (2) whether the injury arose from an "accident"; and (3) whether
"bodily injury" occurred. Courts, policyholders, and insurers must also be
prepared to confront each of these issues in the context of insurance claims
for sexual abuse.
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